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SCHWAB V. REILLY: No OBJECTION
REQUIRED
Ashley Koenen*
Introduction
"Deadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt
parties to act and they produce finality."'
In June of 2010, the Supreme Court determined a procedural
point of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code that will affect over one
million Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors each year.2 In Schwab v.
Reilly, the Court held that when a debtor wishes to exempt his
property from his bankruptcy and ascribes the property a dollar
value, the debtor may only claim an interest in the property up to
that dollar amount - not in the actual property itself.' The
Court also ruled that when a debtor claims a statutorily
permissible dollar value interest in his exempt property, the
trustee has no duty to object to the property exemption within the
30-day objection deadline as prescribed by Federal Bankruptcy
Rule 4003(b).4 In effect, the Court empowered Chapter 7
bankruptcy trustees to object to the value of a debtor's claimed
property exemption at any point during a bankruptcy proceeding
when the claimed dollar value is unobjectionable on its face.'
* J.D: Candidate, May 2012, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
'Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992).
2 The Administration of the United States Courts, 2009 Report of Statistics
Required by BAPCPA, 5, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2009/2009BAPCPA.pdf (last visited Nov. 5,
2010). Nearly 1.4 million people filed for bankruptcy in 2009, an increase of
32% from 2008. Id. Approximately 71% of these cases, up from 66% in 2008,
were filed under Chapter 7. Id.
Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2010); see infra Part III.E.1.
Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2667
Id.; see also Brief for National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy
Attorneys et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Respondent at 22, Schwab v.
Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010) (No. 08-538) [hereinafter Brief for Consumer
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The Schwab decision is significant to any debtor, debtor's
attorney, trustee, or creditor claiming an interest in exempt
property listed on a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.' The Schwab
holding is also consequential to any debtor whose exempt
property value may appreciate during the course of their
bankruptcy.' Moreover, this decision leaves Chapter 7 debtors
without knowledge of whether they can keep their exempt
property for months - even years - after they file a petition,
and ultimately frustrates the primary purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code, namely to provide a "fresh start" for honest debtors.'
A general background of the Bankruptcy Code is
necessary to put the Schwab decision into context and to
demonstrate why the Schwab holding does not accord with. the
pro-debtor laws promulgated by the Bankruptcy Code. 0 Thus,
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of bankruptcy law and
describes its historical progression from the early English
common law to the enactment of the current U.S. Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy Attorneys] (discussing this logical conclusion by stressing that the
Court's reasoning places "absolutely no time limitation upon the time within
which a trustee can challenge the debtor's valuation of the exempt property by
selling it and, by extension, challenge the exemption itself" (emphasis added)).
6 See Kenneth N. Klee, The Supreme Court's Holding in Schwab v. Reilly,
2010 U.S. LEXIS 4974 1, 5 (2010) (discussing the effects of the Schwab decision
to all parties in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case).
' See infra Part V.B. Although the Schwab holding did not explicitly allow
trustees to claim an interest in post-filing property value appreciation, a recent
Ninth Circuit decision interpreted the holding to mean that trustees are
permitted to object to a debtor's exemption valuation - and seek to reclaim
that property - if the exempt property appreciates in value and the
bankruptcy case is not yet closed. See In re Gebhart, 621 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th
Cir. 2010) (holding that a bankruptcy trustee was entitled to reap the benefits
of post-petition appreciation in the debtor's homestead).
8 See Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in American Bankruptcy,
48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1047 (1987) (describing the "fresh start" as a
fundamental principle of the Bankruptcy Code). Courts have long held that
the main purpose of bankruptcy is to give debtors a "fresh start." See, e.g.,
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) ("[Al central. purpose of the
[Bankruptcy] Code is to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent
debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.") (quoting Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918)
("[A] main purpose of [bankruptcy] intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by
giving him a fresh start in life.").
See infra Part IV.B-C.
10 See infra Part I.A.
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Code." Part II then discusses Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings
and the role of exemptions in bankruptcy law." Part II also
discusses the factual history of the Schwab case and provides an
in-depth account of the lower court decisions. 3 Next, this Note
examines why Justice Ginsburg dissented and advocated the
judgment of the lower court. 4 Part III argues that the Schwab
ruling rests on an improper reading of section 522(1), raises
concerns about trustee abuse, and ultimately undermines the
"fresh start" principle. 5 In light of this analysis, Part III argues
that the Court should have affirmed the Third Circuit's
judgment.'"
Part IV examines the impact of the Schwab decision and
discusses the new filing standards imposed upon Chapter 7
debtors as well as the modified duties for trustees." Part IV also
examines how the Schwab decision is evolving, and discusses
how a recent Ninth Circuit decision interpreted the Schwab
holding." Part V concludes that Schwab, while clarifying what
constitutes an exemption claim to which an interested party must
object under section 522(1), ignores a plain reading of the
Bankruptcy Code and, in doing so, unduly vests trustees with the
power to object to a debtor's exemption valuations at any point
prior to debt discharge.19
I. Background
To understand the Schwab decision, it is useful to analyze
the origins and evolution of bankruptcy law in the United
States.2 0 Accordingly, this Part introduces U.S. bankruptcy law
and describes its historic transformation from a creditor's
collection remedy to a system of laws designed to be mutually
beneficial to both creditors and debtors. 2' Next, this Part focuses
on the current United States Bankruptcy Code,22 followed by a
" See infra Part I.B.
1 See infra Part II.
' See infra, Part II.A.1-3.
14 See infra Part lI.D.4.
"See infra Part IV.A.
16 See infra Part IV.
' See infra Part V.A.
1 See infra Part V.B.
' See infra Part VI.
20 Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2010).
2' See infra Part I.A.
2 See infra Part I.B.
360 [Vol. 23:3
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discussion of Chapter 7 bankruptcies and the role of property
exemptions in a bankruptcy proceeding. 23 In addition, to provide
a background of the statutes relevant to the remainder of this
Note, this Part discusses the plain language of Bankruptcy Code
section 522(1) and analyzes how the United States Supreme Court
interpreted this language in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz.2 4
A. The Historical Development of the United States Bankruptcy
Code
The original U.S. bankruptcy laws were derived primarily
from early English common law, when bankruptcy was merely a
creditor's collection remedy. 25 The word "bankruptcy" comes
from the Italian phrase "banca rotta,"26 or broken bench, which
referred to the medieval practice of breaking the benches of a
banker or merchant who left his creditors unpaid. 27 As the roots
of the word suggest, the first English bankruptcy statutes were
directed at merchant debtors and were viciously punitive. 28 As
commerce expanded, however, the need for a more formal and
humane procedure to collect debts became evident.29 Existing
" See infra Part I.B.
24 See infra Part I.B.2.
25 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 7 (1995) [hereinafter Tabb, History of
Bankruptcy Laws].
26 Sandor E. Schick, Globalization, Bankruptcy and the Myth of the
Broken Bench, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 219, 221 (2006). The Latin term was
"bancus ructus." Id.
" Id. Other scholars suggest that "bankruptcy" is rooted in the French
words "banque," a bench, and "route," a trace, implying that the removal of a
banker's bench leaves behind only a trace. F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW 11 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2002) (1919). It has also
been noted that the word bankruptcy may relate to the German word bank,
which refers to a joint stock fund. Id.
28 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 4 (4th ed. 2006).
During this time, a bankrupt individual was considered a criminal and, as
such, subject to criminal punishment ranging from incarceration in debtors'
prison all the way to the extreme sentence of death. Id.; see Roger Evans,
Bankruptcy the American Way, 11 JUTA's Bus. L. 173, 178 (2003) (noting that
the earliest American bankruptcy procedures originated in English practices of
debt slavery and imprisonment). English law was not unique in its lack of
empathy for debtors. Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 7.
In Rome, creditors were apparently authorized to carve up the body of a
debtor, although scholars debate the extent to which this law was actually
enforced. Id.
2 Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 7.
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collection remedies such as execution writs to authorize judicial
seizure of a debtor's property, 0 appraise a debtor's goods,' or
order a judicial sale of a debtor's land,3 did not address the
distinct problems presented by a debtor's multiple defaults.
Creditors needed adequate protection against defaulting debtors
and from other creditors as well.34
Thus, the first English bankruptcy law was passed in 1542
providing a "collective remedy to deal fairly with a multiplicity of
creditors."" This law, entitled "[A]n act against such persons as
do make bankrupts," 6 viewed debtors as quasi-criminals and
placed additional remedies in the hands of creditors.3 ' The
distinctly pro-creditor orientation of English law continued until
1705 with the passage of the Statute of Anne, which permitted
the discharge of debts for a cooperative debtor39 and authorized
debtors to keep their clothing, along with 5% of their remaining
property as exempt from creditors. 4 0  Notably, although this
statute is historically viewed as a humane turning point in the
3o BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 659 (8th ed. 2004) (a writ of fieri facias
authorized the judicial sale of a debtor's property to satisfy a money
judgment).
31 Id. at 559 (a writ of elegit caused a debtor's goods and chattels to be
appraised).
32 Id. at 925-26 (a writ of levarifacias authorized judicial seizure and sale
of a debtor's land).
" Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 7.
34 Id.
3 CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW:
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES & PRACTICE 57 (2003).
36 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-43).
37 Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 7.
38 4 Anne, ch. 17 (1705).
" Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 10 (citing 4 Anne,
ch. 17 (1705)). Under the Statute of Anne, a cooperative debtor was.granted a
monetary allowance out of the bankruptcy estate, the.amount of which was
dependent upon the percentage dividend that was paid to the creditors. Id. At
the same time, however, the Statute of Anne raised the stakes even higher for
uncooperative debtors by permitting the death penalty as a means to punish
fraudulent debtors. Id.
* Richard E. Mendales, Rethinking Bankruptcy Exemptions, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 851, 854 (1999) (citing 4 Anne, ch. 17 (1705)). Under this statute, debtors
could exempt to a maximum of E200 if creditors received a dividend of at least
eight shillings on the pound (40%) of their claims from the sale of debtor's
property. Id. at 851 n.18. If the creditors received less, an estate commissioner
could determine how much, if any, property the debtor would be permitted to
keep beyond his clothing. Id.
[Vol. 23:3362
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evolution of bankruptcy law,4 ' its original intention was to
facilitate creditors' abilities to collect by requiring debtors to
voluntarily surrender their assets and give full financial
disclosures.4 2 Although the Statute of Anne was relatively
progressive, it had severe limitations: eligibility was restricted to
traders and only creditors could file a bankruptcy petition.4 3
1. Bankruptcy Laws Come to America
The framers of the U.S. Constitution clearly had the
English bankruptcy system in mind when they included the
power to enact uniform bankruptcy laws into the Constitution.4 4
James Madison described the underlying purpose and necessity
for federal bankruptcy legislation as "intimately connected with
the regulation of commerce," and necessary to prevent debtors
from fleeing to other states to evade local enforcement of their
obligations.5 Madison's statement shows that, even in the
infancy of American commerce, bankruptcy laws were considered
necessary and prudent.4 6
The progression of U.S. bankruptcy law was slow, and the
first glimpse of permanent bankruptcy laws was not enacted until
1898.47 Prior to this permanent law, the nineteenth century
41 Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note at 25, at 10 ("[T]he
Statute of Anne first established the roots of a more humanitarian legislative
treatment of honest but unfortunate debtors."); see also Charles J. Tabb, The
Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325,
333 (1991) ("Paradoxically, given its historical importance in the evolution of a
more humane treatment of distressed debtors, the statute probably was
motivated largely by concerns for creditors welfare, and may have had only a
limited beneficial effect for most debtors.") [hereinafter Tabb, The Historical
Evolution].
42 Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 10-11.
4 Id. at 11.
44 Id. at 5. The United States Constitution states, "The Congress shall have
power . . . to establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 4. See also 0. 0.
Vrooman, Origin and History of the Bankruptcy Law, 37 CoM. L.J.. 127, 128
(1932) (noting that the first United States Bankruptcy law followed the English
Bankruptcy law in its main features - and even its wording).
45. DAvI A. SKEEL, DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW IN AMERICA 23 (1961); CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN THE
UNITED STATES 7 (William S. Hein & Co. Reprinted 1994) (Harv. Univ. Press,
1935) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 42).
46 F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 6 (William S. Hein &
Co., 2002) (1919).
47 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
3632011]
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marked a period of scattered, impermanent federal bankruptcy
legislation.48 During this period, Congress enacted three
bankruptcy laws - the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,49 the
Bankruptcy Act of 1841,so and the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.51
Each of these Acts was passed during a time of economic distress,
but was repealed once the immediate crisis' was over.5 2 Federal
bankruptcy legislation was viewed merely as a temporary and
emergency measure, necessary when dealing with the aftermath
of economic depression.s3
The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 allowed a debtor to discharge
his debts, but was solely available to merchants and was
contingent on the approval of at least two-thirds of creditors.54
Significantly, this first bankruptcy law permitted a debtor to keep
"necessary wearing apparel" and "necessary bed and bedding"
from the hands of creditors. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 went
a step further and allowed permitted debtors to file for
bankruptcy voluntarily.s6 This Act, like the Act of 1800, also
permitted exemptions for clothing but added an exemption for
"necessary household and kitchen furniture" to not exceed $300.57
48 See JEFF FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING
BANKRUPTCY 415 (2d ed. 2007) (stating that bankruptcy power was "largely
dormant through[out] much of the nineteenth century").
49 Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19,
1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248. The Bankruptcy Act was almost identical to the
English law, with its primary purpose to address the attempts to defraud
creditors. Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 11. However,
the law was highly unpopular among creditors, and by November 1803,
Congress repealed the Act by a vast majority. C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN
THE UNITED STATES HISTORY 19 (1935).
so Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 19, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3,
1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614.
s Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7,
1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99.
52 David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of American
Bankruptcy Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 500 (1998-1999).
5 FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 48, at 135-36.
54 Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, 31, repealed by Act of Dec.
19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.
55 Id.
56 Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 19, 5 Stat. 440, 441 repealed by Act of Mar.
3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was the first pro-
debtor bankruptcy law. See Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25,
at 18 (noting that the Act of 1841 permitted voluntary bankruptcy for debtors,
which has been a feature of all subsequent bankruptcy laws).
5 Brief for Respondent at 57-59, Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010)
(No. 08-538) (citing the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9 § 3, 5 Stat. 440).
[Vol. 23:3364
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However, the law fell into disfavor as creditors saw debtors
disavow legitimate debts without contemplating restitution, and
it was repealed after just two years.ss
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 added an additional pro-
debtor component when it allowed debtors to propose a payment
plan to keep their property. 59 However, the law also required a
creditor's consent to discharge a debt - which ultimately led to
collusion between debtors and creditors as well as illegal payoffs
made to creditors by debtors that ensured a creditor's approval."o
By 1873, Congress was unhappy with the corruption surrounding
the Act of 1867 - so much that the House passed a bill for its
repeal without debate.1
Unlike its short-lived predecessors, the Bankruptcy Act of
189862 remained in effect until 1979.61 In the Act of 1898,
Congress tried to make it easier for a debtor to discharge debt by
eliminating the requirement for a creditor's consent to
discharge.64 Moreover, voluntary bankruptcy was made
available to any individual owing debts.6  The Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 was also the first bankruptcy law to formally recognize a
public interest in granting a discharge to "honest but unfortunate
debtors."6 6 Lawmakers acknowledged that society as a whole
benefited when unburdened debtors were freed from the
oppressive weight of debt,67 as they became more productive
members of society.68 In effect, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
marked the beginning of the modern era of pro-debtor
bankruptcy laws6 9 and transformed the principle theory of
58 FRANK OLDS LOVELAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PROCEEDINGS
IN BANKRUPTCY 9 (1899).
9 Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 21.
60 WARREN, supra note 45, at 113.
61 Id. at 114.
62 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
63 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, §
401(a), 92 Stat. 2549.
64 Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 24.
65 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 4a, 30 Stat. 544, 547 (repealed
1978).
66 Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Laws, 31
MINN. L. REV. 401, 406 (1947).
61 Charles J. Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral
Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 94-
95 (1990).
68 Tabb, The Historical Evolution, supra note 41, at 364-65.
69 Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 24 ("[T]he 1898 Act
ushered in the modern era of liberal debtor treatment in the United States
2011)] 365
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consumer bankruptcy laws - from a creditor's collection remedy
into a system of laws designed to provide a "fresh start" for
debtors.70
B. The Current United States Bankruptcy Code
The current United States Bankruptcy Code was enacted
in 1978, effectively replacing the Act of 1898.1 In response to
laws that were far removed from the pro-debtor ideology of the
contemporary United States, the Bankruptcy Code legislated a
sweeping reform.72 First, it altered the structure of individual
debtor relief available under Chapters 7 (liquidation),3  11
(reorganization),74 and 13 (debt adjustment).s In response to
bankruptcy laws.").
70 Katherine Porter & Dr. Debora Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy's
Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV 67, 68 (2006-2007) (noting that Courts,
Congress and scholars repeatedly cite the fresh start as the justification for a
particular interpretation for the American consumer bankruptcy system); see,
e.g., Local Loan Co. v Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) ("One of the primary
purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to relieve the honest debtor from the weight
of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."); see
also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-197, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
(underscoring the fresh start when recommending changes to consumer
bankruptcy proceedings and administrative structure).
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 402(a), 92
Stat. 2549 (1978).
72 Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 121 (1997) (stating that the reformed Bankruptcy
Code is an "elegant and sophisticated piece of legislation" that "swept away the
years of doctrinal cobwebs and incrustations, replacing them with a lucid,
simple, and apparently humane system for dealing with overburdened debtors
and helpless corporations.").
7 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2010); see infra Part II.A.1.
7 Id. §§ 1101-1174. The modified version of Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
entitled Reorganization, is used by- commercial enterprises that desire to
continue operating a business and repay concurrently through a court-
approved plan or reorganization. Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Bankruptcy Basics: Chapter 11, 5, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx (last visited
Nov. 5, 2010).
7s 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330. A Chapter 13 bankruptcy enables individuals
with regular income to develop a plan to repay all or part of their debts over a
three-to-five year plan depending on income level. Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Bankruptcy Basics: Chapter 13, 5, http://
www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapterl3.a
[Vol. 23:3366
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complaints that bankruptcy judges were bogged down with
administrative duties, the Bankruptcy Code also created the
United States Trustee,76 an agency that appoints private trustees
to oversee the administration of bankruptcy cases." Finally, the
modified Bankruptcy Code enumerated a set of federal
exemptions" and delineated the interconnection of state and
federal laws."
The Bankruptcy Code has been amended several times
since 19780 - most recently in 2005 through the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
("BAPCPA")." Addressing creditor complaints that filing for
bankruptcy had become too easy and that debtors were abusing
the system, 82 BAPCPA was enacted to reduce the number of
"abusive" filings.84 To this end, BAPCPA added income
spx (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). Under this Chapter, debtors propose a
repayment plan to make installments to creditors over three to five years. Id. If
the debtor's current monthly income is less than the applicable state median,
the plan will be for three years unless the court approves a longer period "for
cause." Id. For an alternative interpretation of Chapter 13 bankruptcies, see
David Gray Carlson, The Chapter 13 Estate and Its Discontents, 17 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REVJ. 233, 290 (2009) (arguing that the most coherent
interpretation of Chapter 13 bankruptcies is the "Divestment Theory," or the
theory that a Chapter 3 estate terminates when a debtor confirms a Chapter
13 repayment plan).
76 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2010).
" H.R. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 88 (reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Congressional & Admin. News at 5787, 5963, 6049).
78 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) as amended by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1995).
7 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (delineating the interplay of
bankruptcy exemptions between state and federal law). While bankruptcy
cases are filed in United States Bankruptcy Court (units of the United States
District Courts), and federal law governs procedure in bankruptcy cases, state
laws are often applied when determining property rights. See Tabb, History of
Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 36-37.
8o Tabb, History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 42. Although there
have been many changes to bankruptcy law since 1978, the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994 is cited as the most significant for the creation of the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission and the unprecedented number of
substantive amendments to the Code. Id. For a comprehensive look at
Bankruptcy Legislation since 1978, see id. at 37-51.
1 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C. (2005)).
82 See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 15-16 (2005) (discussing closing loopholes
in the bankruptcy laws to deter "easy" and abusive bankruptcies).
83 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A) (2010). Abuse is presumed if the debtor's
2011]. 367
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restrictions," implemented mandatory credit counseling," and
placed limitations on bankruptcy lawyers." With these
additional barriers, personal bankruptcy filings were expected to
drop dramatically."
1. Chapter 7: The Most Common Form of Bankruptcy in
America
Even with BAPCPA's additional restrictions (intended to
aggregate current monthly income over 5 years, net of certain statutorily
allowed expenses, is more than (i) $11,725, or (ii) 25% of the debtor's non-
priority unsecured debt, as long as that amount is at least $7,025. The debtor
may rebut a presumption of abuse only by a showing of special circumstances
that justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income. 11
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B) (2010). Unless the debtor overcomes the presumption of
abuse, the case will generally be converted to Chapter 13 (with the debtor's
consent) or will be dismissed. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2010).
84 SHEILA M. WILLIAMS & GEORGE M. BASHARIS, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE
PREVENTION AND. CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005: LAW AND
EXPLANATION 53-54 (2005). As he signed BAPCPA into law, President Bush
underscored BAPCPA's purpose when he declared: "If someone does not pay
his debts, the rest of society ends up paying them. In recent years, too many
people have abused the bankruptcy laws. They've walked away from debts
even when they had the ability to repay them . . . Under the new law,
Americans who have the ability to pay will be required to pay back at least a
portion of their debts. Those who fall behind their state's -median income will
not be required to pay back their debts. The new law will also make it more
difficult for serial filers to abuse the most generous bankruptcy protections."
Press Release, The White House, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention, Consumer Protection Act, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2010).
85 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2010). Courts use an income-based formula called the
"means test" to assess a debtor's financial situation. Id. If the means test
reveals that, based on a debtor's income and expenses, a debtor can afford to
repay his debts, a debtor's Chapter 7 filing may be considered "presumptively
abusive," and thus preclude the debtor from filing. Id. For further information
about means test calculations, see U.S. Trustee Program, Census Bureau, IRS
Data and Administrative Expense Multipliers, http://www.justice.gov/ust/
eo/bapcpalmeanstesting.htm (last updated Oct. 1, 2010)..
86 Id. §§ 109, 111. No individual may be a debtor under Chapter 7 or any
Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code unless he has, within 180 days before filing,
received credit counseling from an approved credit counseling agency either in
an individual or group briefing. Id.
87 Id. § 5 26(a) (listing what a debt relief agency shall not do).
8 See Bruce M. Price & Terry Dalton, From Downhill to Slalom: An
Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (and Some Unintended
Consequences), 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 135, 165 (2008) (discussing
Congress' expectations to reduce Chapter 7 filings).
[Vol. 23:3368
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specifically decrease abusive bankruptcy filings), personal
bankruptcy rates have continued to increase.89 In 2009, debtors
filed 1.4 million bankruptcies in the United States, a 32% increase
from 2008.90 Notably, approximately 71% of these cases - up
from 66% in 2008 - were filed under Chapter 7, where a
debtor's assets are liquidated and the nonexempt assets are
distributed to creditors." Chapter 7 is popular because it
involves a fairly short process - on average a Chapter 7
bankruptcy is completed in approximately 120 days9 2 - and does
not affect a debtor's future income." Moreover, many Chapter 7
debtors are unrepresented by legal counsel.94
In accordance with the Bankruptcy Code's purpose,
Chapter 7 bankruptcies are rooted in the interest of giving
debtors a "fresh start."95  After a debtor files a Chapter 7
89 See id. at 179; see generally Robert M. Lawless, et. al., Did Bankruptcy
Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J.
349, 354 (discussing empirical trends since the passage of BAPCPA).
90 The Administration of the United States Courts, 2009 Report of
Statistics Required by BAPCPA, 5, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2009/2009BAPCPA.pdf (last visited
Nov. 5, 2010).
" Id. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 159(b), enacted as part of the BAPCPA, the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is required to
submit an annual report to Congress on certain bankruptcy statistics detailed
in 28 U.S.C. § 159(c). Id.
92 Id. at 6. Of the 880,654 Chapter 7 consumer cases closed in 2009, the
mean time interval from filing to disposition Was 168 days, and the median
time interval was 120 days. See also Brief for Consumer Bankruptcy
Attorneys, supra note 5, at 22 (offering 120 days as the average lifespan of a
Chapter 7 proceeding based on deadlines imposed by the Bankruptcy Code
and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy).
" See Elijah M. Alper, Opportunistic Informal Bankruptcy, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1908, 1914 (2010) (discussing why debtors tend to prefer Chapter 7
bankruptcies to Chapter 13, which requires payments to creditors from a
debtor's future income, a process that can span several years).
9 Ed Flynn & Phil Crewson, Data Show Trends in Post-BAPCPA
Bankruptcy Filings, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, 17 (2008), available at
www.justice.gov/ustleo/publicaffairs/articles/docs/2 008/abi_2 00808.pdf (last
visited Nov. 5, 2010) (in 2008, roughly 70,000 bankruptcies were filed without
legal assistance). See Brief for Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, supra note 5,
at 37 (reminding the Supreme Court that many Chapter 7 debtors file on a pro
se basis).
11 TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 35, at 66. The concept of the "fresh
start," offering debtors relief from a potential lifetime of debt and giving them
a new chance for success, dates back to biblical times. See Deuteronomy 15:1-2
("At the end of every seven years you must cancel debts. This is how it is to be
done: Every creditor shall cancel the loan he has made to his fellow Israelite.
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bankruptcy petition, the debtor receives an "automatic stay,"
which stops creditors from all current and future collection
efforts."6 Bankruptcy ends when the debtor receives a discharge,
by which all outstanding debts are forgiven." The discharge, in
effect, serves as the debtor's "fresh start."98
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, a trustee is assigned to
his case. 99  The trustee, also known as the bankruptcy
administrator, follows the Bankruptcy Code when making
decisions about the administrative aspects of a bankruptcy
case.1" In general, the trustee will collect the debtor's property
He shall not require payment from his fellow Israelite brother"). Courts
consistently reaffirm this principle in bankruptcy cases. See, e.g., Gronan v.
Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (stating that the purpose of bankruptcy is to
give debtors a "new opportunity in life and a clear field for a future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.").
However, many scholars criticize the truth behind this widely used maxim.
See, e.g., Katherine Porter and Dr. Debora Thorne, The Failure of
Bankruptcy's Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV 67, 68-70 (2006-2007) (arguing
that the phrase "fresh start" is misleading and that bankruptcy is an
incomplete tool to rehabilitate debtors).
96 TABB & BRUBAKER supra note 35, at 66. As long as the stay remains in
effect, creditors cannot bring or continue lawsuits, make wage garnishments,
or even make telephone calls demanding payment. Id. Creditors receive notice
from the clerk of court that the debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition. Id.
9 Id.
9 See Alper, supra note 93, at 1915.
* The 'U.S. Attorney General appoints a separate Trustee for each of
twenty-one geographical regions for a five-year term. 28 U.S.C. § 581. Each
Trustee works under the general supervision of the Attorney General, and can
be removed from office thereby. Id. The U.S. Trustees maintain regional
offices that correspond with federal judicial districts and are administratively
overseen by the Executive Office for United States Trustees in Washington,
D.C. Id. Each United States Trustee, an officer of the U.S. Department of
Justice, is responsible for maintaining and supervising a panel of private
Trustees for Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. 28 U.S.C. § 586. Under section 307 of
Title 11, a U.S. Trustee "may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue
in any case or proceeding" in bankruptcy except for filing a plan of
reorganization in a Chapter 11 case. 11 U.S.C. § 307.
'0 ROBERT E. GINSBURG, ROBERT D. MARTIN & SUSAN V. KELLEY,
GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKRUPTCY 4.01, 4-7 (4th ed. 2007); see In re
Benny, 29 B.R. 754, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("The trustee is a creature of statute
and has only those powers conferred thereby."). "The trustee is a party with
equal status to other persons interested in the outcome of the case." HENRY J.
SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 28 (John Rao ed.,
Nat'l Consumer Law Center, 7th ed. 2004). Accordingly, the trustee may sue
or be sued as the representative of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. See, e.g.,
Wieburg v. GTE Southwest, Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 308-09 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding
that trustee should have been allowed to join or ratify debtor's employment
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and put it into a bankruptcy estate,'o liquidate the nonexempt
property as quickly as possible,10 2 acquire other assets for the
bankruptcy estate, 0 ' and arrange for the distribution of the
bankruptcy estate proceeds to either the debtor or his creditors in
accordance with the Bankruptcy Code.'0 Moreover, the trustee
must investigate the debtor's financial affairs1 and, if the trustee
suspects misrepresentation, fraud, or abuse, they must oppose the
debtor's discharge. 106  Significantly, the trustee also has the
burden of proving that any exemptions are not properly
claimed. 0 7
2. Exemptions in Chapter 7
When a debtor files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, his
assets become property of the bankruptcy estate, 0 subject to his
right to reclaim certain property as "exempt."09 Exemptions
discrimination case).
101 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2010) (enumerating trustee duties during the
liquidation of the bankruptcy estate). The term "bankruptcy estate" describes
the aggregation of property rights that can be administered by the court in a
bankruptcy case. SOMMER, supra note 100, at 20. The estate is created when a
debtor files a bankruptcy petition and it generally consists of all the debtor's
interests in any property as of that time. Id.
102 Id. § 704(a)(1) ("The trustee shall . . . collect and reduce to money the
property of the estate for which such trustee serves, and close such estate as
expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest").
103 Id. ("The trustee shall . . . collect and reduce to money the property of
the estate for which such trustee serves").
104 Id. § 704(a)(9) ("The trustee-shall ... make a final report and file a final
account of the administration of the estate with the court and with the United
States trustee").
' Id. § 704(a)(4) ("The trustee shall . . . investigate the financial affairs of
the debtor).
106 Id. § 704(a)(6) ("The trustee shall .. . if advisable, oppose the discharge
of the debtor).
107 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(c) ("the objecting party has' the burden of
proving that the exemptions are not properly claimed").
lo 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2010).
109 Id. § 522. While the Act of 1898 left exemption laws up to the states, the
1978 reform enacted its own set of federal exemptions because of concerns that
the laws were out of date. David E. Skeel, Jr., Vern, Countryman and the Path
of Progressive (and Populist) Bankruptcy Scholarship, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1075, 1082 (2000). Under the U.S. bankruptcy system, there are federal
exemptions as well as state exemptions, and states have the option to opt out of
federal exemptions. FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 47, at 149. In fact, the
vast majority have opted out, and only a few allow a debtor to choose between
federal and state exemptions. Alper, supra note 9.3, at 1916. Thus, bankruptcy,
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reflect what society views as property that is integral to a
person's livelihood, which should be protected from creditors'
claims.10 To this end, the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to
exempt property such as clothing,' professional tools,112 or an
automobile,"3 up to a certain dollar amount.114  Permitting a
debtor to retain certain assets serves the "fresh start" policy on
which the Bankruptcy Code is based."' To the extent that
exemptions allow a debtor to continue working and commence
his financial rehabilitation, exemptions. serve the best interests of
the debtor, the debtor's dependents, and society as a whole."I
To ensure that a debtor will know whether his claimed
in large part, applies federal procedure to substantive state laws. Id. In other
words, the state law furnishes only the type of exemption and its monetary
limits, while the Bankruptcy Code governs the application of those
exemptions. Id. (citing Richard H.W. Maloy, "She'll Be Able to Keep Her
Home Won't She?" - The Plight of a Homeowner in Bankruptcy, 2003 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 315, 326 (2003)).
no KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 46 (1997); see 1-13
COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY GUIDE [ 13.08 (2009) ("The purpose of
exemption laws has always been to allow debtors to keep those items of
property deemed essential to daily life.").
"1 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3) (2010) ("The debtor's interest, not to exceed $400
in value in any particular item or $8000 in aggregate value, in household
furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals,
crops, or musical instruments, that are held primarily for the personal, family,
or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor").
112 Id. § 552(d)(6) ("The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $1500 in
value, in any implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the
debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor").
11 Id. § 522(d)(2) ("The debtor's interest, not to exceed $2400 in value, in
one motor vehicle").
114 Id. § 522(d). States that opt out of federal bankruptcy exemptions are
free to set different monetary limits. See Ronel Elul & Narayann
Subramanian, Forum-Shopping and Personal Bankruptcy, 21 J. FIN. SERVICES
RES. 233, 233 (2002) (stating that, in practice, all states have set their own
monetary caps for exemptions).
"' CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 640 (1997). The
legislative history behind bankruptcy exemption statutes indicates that the
purpose of the exemption laws has been "to protect a debtor from his creditors,
[and] to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that even if his
creditors levy on all of his nonempty property, the debtor will not be left
destitute and a public charge." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977). Courts
often reaffirm this principle. See, e.g., United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459
U.S. 70, 72 (1982) ("[Bankruptcy] exemptions were designed to permit
individual debtors to retain exempt property so that they will be able to enjoy
a 'fresh start' after bankruptcy.").
116 TABB, supra note 115, at 640.
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exemptions are exempt in a timely manner, Federal Bankruptcy
Rule 4003(b) requires that a "party in interest""' file an objection
within 30 days of the initial meeting of the creditors."' If an
interested party fails to object within the designated 30-day
timeframe, section 522(1) of Bankruptcy Code prescribes that
"unless a party in interest objects . . . the property claimed as
exempt.. . is exempt."" 9 In effect, Rule 4003(b) works in tandem
with section 522(1) to enable a debtor to know whether he will be
able to keep his claimed exemptions within 30 days of filing for
bankruptcy.120 Once the objection period has passed, the debtor
is secure in the fact that he will reclaim the exempt property, and
11 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). Under Rule 4003(b), objections to
exemptions must be filed and must therefore be in writing. Id. The phrase
"party of interest" includes a trustee. See Edmonston v. Murphy (In re
Edmonston), 107 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a trustee is a party in
interest entitled to oppose a claim of exemption); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
938 F.2d 421, 425 (1991) (noting that a trustee or other party in interest may
file an objection to a claim of exemption), affd, 503 U.S. 638 (1992). Although
creditors can object to debtor's exemptions, they often do not object, instead
letting the trustee shoulder the expense and burden of litigation. 1-13 COLLIER
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE 13.08 (2009).
"I Fed. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) ("A party in interest may file an objection to
the list of property claimed as exempt within 30 days after the meeting of
creditors held under § 341(a) is concluded or within 30 days after any
amendment to the list or supplemental schedules is filed, whichever is later.").
The initial creditors meeting is the initial fact-finding meeting between the
debtor and the trustee that "starts the clock" for subsequent deadlines in the
case. See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2671 (2010) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the creditors meeting as the point where the "30-day
clock on filing objections had begun to run."). However, if a debtor amends his
schedule of claimed exemptions, the time for objections starts anew. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1). The only exceptions to the 30-day rule for filing
objections to exemptions are contained in Rule 4003(b)(2)-(3). FED. R. BANKR.
P. 4003(b)(2)-(3). Rule 4003(b)(2) permits the trustee, and only the trustee, to
object to a fraudulently asserted exemption within one year after the case is
closed. 1-13 COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE 13.08
(2009). This exception is unlikely to be utilized often, because a trustee seldom
devotes any attention to a case after it is closed. Id. It would probably come
into play only if some third party alerted the trustee to an alleged fraudulent
exemption claim. Id. Rule 4003(b)(3) governs exceptions under section 522(q),
which limits a state homestead exemption to $136,875 for debtors who have
been convicted of certain crimes or are liable for certain bad acts. Id.
n1 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (2010).
120 See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2658 (2010) ("The Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy require. interested parties to file within 30 days after the
conclusion of the creditors meeting . . . If an interest party fails to object in the
time allowed, a claimed exemption will exclude the subject property from the
estate").
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the trustee loses the right to preserve that property for the
bankruptcy estate.12 1
3. Interpreting Section, 522(1) and Rule 4003(b): Taylor v.
Freeland & Kronz
Although Rule 4003(b) and section 522(1) unambiguously
state that a party in interest must object to a claimed exemption
within 30 days of the initial creditors' meeting,122 problems arise
in cases where the value of a claimed exemption is not clearly or
properly stated and a trustee fails to object.2 In Taylor v.
Freeland & Kronz,124 the Supreme Court considered a case in
which a debtor improperly claimed the proceeds of a pending
lawsuit as exempt, and listed the value of the proceeds as
"unknown."125 1In Taylor, debtor Davis claimed an exemption in
the expected proceeds from her pending employment
discrimination suit.126  Petitioner Taylor, the trustee of Davis'
bankruptcy estate, did not object to the claimed exemption within
the 30-day period prescribed by Rule 4003(b).12 7 The employment
discrimination lawsuit was eventually settled for $110,000.128
Upon learning about the settlement, Taylor filed a complaint in
bankruptcy court against both Davis and her attorneys in the
121 1-13 COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE 13.08
(2009).
122 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2010) (governing initial creditors meeting procedures).
The debtor's first, and often only, appearance at any kind of hearing usually
occurs at the debtor's section 341(a) meeting, known as the "meeting of the
creditors." SOMMER, supra note 100, at 35. This proceeding gives the various
parties a chance to examine the debtor and his affairs. See id.
123 See, e.g., Olson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 377 B.R. 865, 870 (B.A.P.
6th Cir. 2007) (examining a case where debtors scheduled property that they
jointly owned with non-debtor co-owners as having "total value of about
$30,000," and claiming $15,000 exemption for their one-half interest in
property; and where trustee failed to timely object); Hyman v. Plotkin (In re
Hyman), 967 F.2d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing a case where a debtor
listed "homestead" instead of "homestead exemption" on her schedules and
trustee failed to timely object).
124 503 U.S. 638, 646 (1992).
125 Id. at 640 (stating that debtor described her exempt property as
"Proceeds from lawsuit - [Davis] v. TWA" and "Claim for lost wages" and
listed its value as "unknown.").
126 Id. ("[debtor] declared bankruptcy while she was pursuing an
employment discrimination claim in the state courts.").
12' Id. at 641 ("Taylor decided not to object to the claimed exemption. The
record reveals that Taylor doubted that the lawsuit had any value.").
128 Id. ("TWA agreed to pay Davis a total of $110,000.").
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employment lawsuit, demanding that they turn over -settlement
proceeds as property of Davis' bankruptcy estate.12 9
The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Taylor, finding
that, although he was a "party in interest" pursuant to
Bankruptcy Code section 522(1) - and though he had failed to
object to the debtor's claimed exemption within 30 days as
required by Rule 4003(b) - the obligation to object did not arise,
and therefore, he preserved for the bankruptcy estate the value of
the lawsuit settlement.3 0 The United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania affirmed and ordered Davis
and her lawyers to return a sum sufficient to pay off all of Davis'
unpaid creditors.'' However, the Third Circuit reversed the
district court's decision, holding that section 522(1) - which
expressly states that unless a party in interest objects, the
property claimed as exempt is exempt - must be interpreted
literally. 13 2
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Third Circuit's judgment.'3  Justice Thomas, writing for the
Court, explained that Davis did not have a right to exempt more
than a small portion of the proceeds from the lawsuit on her
Schedule C, but she nevertheless claimed the full amount. as
exempt when she listed the value of the lawsuit as "unknown"
and the value of her exemption as "unknown."13 4 The Court held
121 Id. ("Upon learning of the settlement, Taylor filed a complaint against
respondents in the Bankruptcy Court. He demanded that respondents turn
over the money that they had received from Davis because he considered it
property of Davis' bankruptcy estate.").
130 In re Davis, 105 B.R. 288, 294 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (noting, however
that "Had the Trustee acted with knowledge and/or diligence, the present
action, in all likelihood, never would have arisen.").
11In re Davis, 118 B.R. 272, 276 (W.D, Pa. 1990) (concluding, "the
bankruptcy court did not commit reversible error in valuing the lawsuit at
$110,000").
132 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 938 F.2d 420, 426 (7th Cir. 1991) ("A
strong policy rationale supports the literal approach. The time limits and
obligations established by section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) serve the dual
purposes of finality and security.").
133 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 646 (1992).
134 Id. at 642. The Court further concluded: "In this case, as noted, Davis
claimed the proceeds from her employment discrimination lawsuit as exempt
by listing them in the schedule that she filed under § 522(1). The parties agree
that Davis did not have a right to exempt more than a small portion of these
proceeds either under state law or under the federal exemptions specified in §
522(d). Davis in fact claimed the full amount as exempt. Taylor, as a result,
apparently could have made a valid objection under § 522(1) and Rule 4003 if
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that Taylor could have objected to the exemption under Rule
4003(b) within the 30-day period."' His failure to do so thereby
excluded the proceeds from the lawsuit from the bankruptcy
estate. 136
Aside from underscoring the importance of deadlines in a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, the Court noted that the
trustee could have pursued other remedies if there was a question
of valuation; he could have sought a hearing on the issue, or
asked the bankruptcy court for an extension of time to object.13 7
To the extent that existing penalties for improper conduct in
bankruptcy proceedings did not limit bad-faith claims of
exemptions by debtors, the Court reasoned that it had no
authority to limit the application of section -522(l) to Davis'
exemption, which was claimed in good faith." In sum, the court
held that section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) should be read plainly:"3
if a trustee does not object to a claimed exemption within 30 days,
a debtor keeps his claimed property. 4 0
II. Discussion
Despite the Court's holding in Taylor, in Schwab v. Reilly,
the Court held that section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) should not be
interpreted literally in cases where a debtor undervalues her
claimed exemption and a trustee fails to object within the
he had acted promptly. We hold, however, that his failure to do so prevents
him from challenging the validity of the exemption now." Id.
135 Id.
16 Id. The Court reasoned that if Taylor did not know the value of the
potential proceeds of the lawsuit, he "could have sought a hearing on the issue,
or he could have asked the Bankruptcy Court for an extension of time to
object." Id at 644. Having done neither, the Court found that Taylor could not
seek to deprive Davis of the exemption by objection after the designated 30-
day timeframe had elapsed. Id.
"' Id. Importantly, the Court stressed that Taylor sat on his rights and
thus, did not preserve his right to object to Davis' claimed exemption after the
30-day period had expired. See id. The Court underscored the importance of
timeliness in bankruptcy proceedings when it stated, "[d]eadlines may lead to
unwelcome results, they prompt parties to act and they produce finality." Id.
"s Id. at 644-45 (noting that although Congress may enact provisions to
bad faith claims under section 522(1), "We have no authority to limit the
application of § 522(1) to exemptions claimed in good faith.").
13 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 57, at 35-37 (summarizing the
implications of the Court's holding in Taylor).
140 Id.
376 [Vol. 23:3
Schwab v. Reilly: No Objection Required
designated 30-day period.14 1 This Part begins with the factual
background of the casel42 and then discusses the Schwab
decision, including the decision of the bankruptcy court, 143 district
court,144 and the Third Circuit.145 Finally, this Part explains how
the Supreme Court ultimately resolved the circuit split. 146
A. Factual Background
Debtor Nadejda Reilly, who owned and operated a small
catering business, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.14 7  Reilly
wished to claim some catering equipment as exempt.148  To
exempt particular items of property from her bankruptcy estate,
section 52 2(1) of the Bankruptcy Code required Reilly to "file a list
of property that [she] claim[ed] as exempt."14 9  Rule 4003(a)15 0
further instructed Reilly to list her claimed exemptions on a
schedule of assets required by Rule 1007.s1 In relevant part, Rule
1007 directs the filing of various schedules of assets through the
use of the appropriate official forms - in this case Official Form
6.215 Form 6 includes a Schedule B,5 3 which requires a debtor to
list all of his personal property, and also a Schedule C,15 4 which
141 Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2010).
142 See infra Part II.A.
143 See infra Part II.A.
144 See infra Part II.B.
145 See infra Part II.C.
146 See infra Part II.D.
14 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2657.
148 Brief for Respondent, supra note 57. Because Reilly was an individual,
she was entitled to claim property as exempt from the bankruptcy estate. See
Rousey v. Jocaway, 544 U.S. 320, 325 (2005) ("To help the debtor obtain a
fresh start, the Bankruptcy Code permits him to withdraw from the estate
certain interests in property, such as his car or home, up to certain values.");
Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991) ("An exemption is an interest
withdrawn from the estate (and hence from the creditors) for the benefit of the
debtor . . . Property that is properly exempted under § 522 is (with some
exceptions) immunized against liability for pre-bankruptcy debts.").
149 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2660.
.15o FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(a).
151 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007.
152 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(1)(A); FED. R. BANKR. P. Form 6 (2005).
"I FED. R. BANKR,. P. Form 6, Schedule B (2005). The Official Form
entitled "Schedule B - Personal Property Instructions" is the list requiring
debtors to list their assets. Id. This form requires a debtor to make three
specific entries for each asset: (i) type of property; (ii) description of the
property and its location; and (iii) state the value of the property. Id.
154 Schwab, 130 C. Ct. at 2657. The Official Form entitled "Schedule C -
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further requires a debtor to list personal property he wishes to
claim as exempt.'s
On her Schedule B list of personal property, Reilly
included an itemized list of catering equipment - describing it as
"business -equipment" - and estimated its market value at
$10,718.6 On her Schedule C list of exemptions, she claimed two
exemptions in the business equipment: 1) an exemption for $1,850
under the "tools of the trade" exemption of section 522(d)(6),'57
which permitted a debtor to exempt an aggregate interest up to
$1,850 in value; and 2) an exemption for $8,658 under the "wild-
card" exemption of section 522(d)(5),' 58 which allowed her to
exempt an aggregate interest in any property up to $10,225.*
Thus, Reilly listed identical amounts of $10,718 on both her
Schedule B list of assets and her Schedule C list of claimed
exemptions for the same "business equipment."' 6 0
William Schwab was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee in
Reilly's bankruptcy."" Prior to the initial meeting of creditorsl 6 2
- the event that "starts the clock"' for subsequent bankruptcy
Property Claimed As Exempt" is the "list of property claimed as exempt."
Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2658. This form requires a debtor to make four specific
entries for each asset claimed as exempt: (i) describe the property claimed as
exempt; (ii) specify the law which serves as the basis for the exemption; (iii)
state the value of the claimed exemption; and (iv) state the "current value of
property without deducting [the] exemption." FED. R. BANKR. P. Form 6,
Schedule C (2005).
155 Brief for Respondent, supra note 57, at 7 (citing FED. R..BANKR. P.
Form 6, Schedules B, C (2005)).
116 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2658.
157 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (2005).
iss Id. § 522(d)(5) (providing for an exemption in a debtor's aggregate
interest in any property not covered by any other category).
1s9 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2657.
160 Id. In this case, between § 522(d)(6) and §522(d)(5), Reilly had a total of
$11,195 in exemptions available to her, which she applied on her schedules to
cooking equipment she valued at $10,718. Brief for Respondent, supra note 57,
at 8. In other words, in claiming her cooking equipment as exempt, Reilly did
not exhaust the entire amount of her available exemptions under these two
provisions. Id. Instead, she placed values on the cooking equipment she
claimed as exempt and took her exemptions accordingly, listing as exempt the
full value of her equipment. Id. at 9.
16' See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2657.
162 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (Within a reasonable time after the order for relief in
a case under this title, the United States trustee shall convene and preside at a
meeting of creditors).
163 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2671 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that
Schwab had his meeting of creditors "[b]efore the 30-day clock on objections
378 [Vol. 23:3
Schwab v. Reilly: No Objection Required
deadlines - Schwab sought an appraisal of the equipment.16 4
The appraisal revealed that the equipment could be worth as
much as $17,000 - approximately $6,500 more than Reilly listed
on her Schedule B.6 s According to Rule 4003(b) of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,166 Schwab was required to object
to Reilly's claimed exemptions within 30 days following the
initial creditors' meeting or he would be precluded from
challenging the claimed exemption, even if the amount of the
claimed exemption exceeded statutory limits.' 6 7  However,
Schwab did not object.'6  Instead, he moved the bankruptcy
court for permission to auction Reilly's business equipment, give
the exempt amount of $10,718 to Reilly, and distribute the
remainder of the money to Reilly's creditors. 169
In his motion to auction the equipment, Schwab argued
that he was not obligated to object to Reilly's claimed exemptions
for two main reasons.170 First, he argued that he had no duty to
object because Reilly's claimed exemptions were facially valid -
the dollar value Reilly assigned each exemption fell within the
had begun to run").
164 Id. at 2658; see Brief for Petitioner at 20-26, Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S.
Ct. 2652 (2010) (No. 08-538) (stating Schwab "suspected, but did not know,
that Reilly's kitchen equipment might be worth more than $10,718.").
165 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 164, at 20-26 (noting that the auctioneer
stated that the equipment was worth $17,000, and maybe even more).
166 The Federal Rules Of Bankruptcy Procedure provides: "[A] party in
interest may file an objection to the list of property claimed as exempt within
30 days after the meeting of creditors held under § 341(a) is concluded or
within 30 days after any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules is
filed, whichever is later. The court may, for cause, extend the time for filing
objections if, before the time to object expires, a party in interest files a request
for an extension." FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1).
1" See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 642-43 (1992)
(interpreting FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) and 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) to mean that a
trustee's failure to make a timely objection to a claimed exemption precludes a
challenge, even if there is no colorable basis for the exemption).
161 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2658; see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 164, at
20-26 (discussing that Schwab held a meeting of creditors on June 22, 2005,
and indicated that there might be value in Reilly's kitchen equipment, but did
not raise an objection).
169 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 164, at 26 ("On August 10, 2005,
Schwab filed a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking permission to
auction Reilly's kitchen equipment so that he could turn over the $10,718 in
exempt value to Reilly and distribute the excess value, less costs, to her
creditors.").
10 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2658.
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limits assigned by sections 522(d)(5) and (6)."' Accordingly,
Schwab believed that he had no obligation to object to any value
that exceeded this amount. 17 2
Schwab also contended that when Reilly listed identical
amounts of $10,718 on both her Schedule B list of assets and her
Schedule C list of claimed exemptions, she did not demonstrate
her intent to fully exempt the property, but rather claimed only a
dollar value interest in the property."' Schwab pointed to the
statutory language of section 522(1), which provides that
"property claimed as exempt ... is exempt"17 4 and argued that
"property claimed as exempt" should be defined as an "interest"
up to a certain dollar amount, and not the property itself.s75
Accordingly, he asserted that the value of kitchen equipment
should be judged solely on the value Reilly assigned to the
interest ($10,718) of the kitchen equipment."'7  To the extent that
Rule 4003(b) only functions to compel opposition to the list of
property claimed as exempt within 30 days (not the list of
interests), Schwab argued that he was not required to object to
Reilly's claimed exemption within 30 days of the creditor's
meeting. 77
Reilly opposed Schwab's motion, arguing that because the
amount of the exemption she claimed in the cooking equipment
171 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 164, at 32 ("The text of the Bankruptcy
Code and Rules themselves make clear that Schwab was not required to object
to Reilly's facially valid exemption in order to liquidate property worth more
than the claimed exemption.").
.. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661. In a subsequent Brief to the Supreme
Court, Schwab explained this argument in the following way:
Here, all parties agree that no objection was filed. Any
property claimed as exempt on Schedule C, therefore, is
exempt. The only question, then, is the extent of Reilly's
claimed exemption on Schedule C. And the answer to that
appears on the face of Reilly's Schedule C itself: Reilly
'claimed as exempt' a $10,718 interest in her kitchen
equipment.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 164, at 32.
17 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 164, at 20-26 (arguing that Reilly
claimed only an interest of $10,718 in her kitchen-not the kitchen equipment
itself).
174 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (2005) ("unless a party in interest objects, the property
claimed as exempt . .. is exempt").
"' Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661.
176 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 164, at 20-26.
'" Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2658.
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was equal to her valuation of the equipment, she had put Schwab
and her creditors on notice that she intended to exempt the
equipment's full value, even if that amount turned out to be more
than the dollar amount she declared (and more than the
Bankruptcy Code allowed).18  Reilly asserted that because her
Schedule C list of claimed exemptions notified Schwab of her
intent to exempt the full value of her business equipment, he was
obligated to object if he wished to preserve the estate's right to
retain any value in the equipment in excess of her $10,718
estimation."'7  Because Schwab did not object within the time
prescribed by Rule 4003(b), Reilly asserted that the estate
forfeited its claim and interest in her business equipment.8 0
In addition to opposing Schwab's motion,. Reilly
submitted a conditional motion to dismiss if the bankruptcy court
ruled in Schwab's favor.' Reilly claimed that she attached
"extraordinary sentimental value" to the catering equipment
because it had been a gift from her parents, who had purchased it
for her despite their own financial difficulties.182 Reilly informed
the bankruptcy court that she would rather dismiss her
bankruptcy case than have the equipment sold at auction.8 3
B. The Bankruptcy Court Decision: Trustee's Failure to Object
Means the Debtor Keeps Her Property
The United States Bankruptcy- Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania denied both Reilly's motion to dismiss
her case and Schwab's motion to auction the equipment.18 4 From
Reilly's filings, the bankruptcy judge found it evident that Reilly
had claimed the property itself, not its dollar value as exempt.' 5
18 Brief for Petitioner supra note 164, at 15.
"' Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661. It should be noted that had Schwab
informed Reilly that her business equipment was in jeopardy, she could have
amended her Schedule C accordingly. See SOMMER, supra note 100, at 82
(stating that Schedule C may be amended as of right at any time before the
close of the case so that mistakes and oversights are easily corrected).
18o Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661.
11 Brief for Respondent, supra note 57, at 11-12.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 In re Reilly, 403 B.R. 336, 339 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2006) (discussing the
bankruptcy court's holding). After 1984, all matters arising under the
Bankruptcy Code, or arising in or related to cases under the Bankruptcy Code,
are initially referred by the district court to the bankruptcy court, subject to
certain restrictions. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2010).
"8 Id. at 337.
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Additionally, the Court found that Schwab waived his right to
challenge the valuation of the property by failing to object to
Reilly's exemptions in the 30-day period permitted by Rule
4003(b).186 Thus, the bankruptcy court blocked the sale of
Reilly's business equipment. 1 8 1
C. The District Court Decision: Affirming the Bankruptcy
Court's Decision
Schwab appealed the decision to the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which affirmed
the decision of the bankruptcy court.' Like the bankruptcy.
court, the district court concluded that by listing the identical
amount of $10,718 as both the property's market value and the
value of the claimed exemptions, Reilly had signaled her
intention to safeguard all of her catering equipment, from
inclusion in the bankruptcy estate.18 9
The district court held that the case was governed by
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,9 " and therefore interpreted Rule
4003(b) and section 522(1) to mean that Schwab's failure to make
a timely objection precluded his later challenge.'91 The district
court found the case to be factually analogous to Allen v. Green,'9 2
an Eleventh Circuit case whereby a debtor claimed a $1
exemption in a pending lawsuit, the trustee failed to object, and
the lawsuit settled for $15,000.193 Like the Allen court, which.
relied on the Taylor holding to rule in favor of the debtor, the
district court held that Taylor also controlled this case.194
Therefore, because Schwab failed to challenge the entire reported
value of $10,718 in a timely manner, the district court held that
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at339.
189 Id.
190 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643 (1992); see supra Part
I.B.3 (discussing Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz).
191 In re Reilly, 403 B.R. at 337.
12 31 F.3d 1098, 1101 (11th Cir. 1994).
" Id. The Allen trustee argued that because the debtor exempted only one
dollar of the personal injury lawsuit, all but one dollar of the personal injury
lawsuit settlement belonged to the bankruptcy estate. Id. This was precisely
the trustee's argument in Schwab. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2669
(2010). In Schwab, the trustee argued that Reilly was only entitled to a $10,718
interest in the property she listed on her Schedule C. Id.
1 In re Reilly, 403 B.R. at 339.
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Reilly was entitled to the entire value of her business equipment,
even if the trustee valued it as more than she estimated. 95
Consequently, the district court denied Schwab's appeal and
affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling.' 6
D. The Appellate Court Decision: Affirming the District Court's
Judgment
Schwab then appealed to the Third Circuit."' The Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision finding that when a
debtor indicated intent to exempt his entire interest in a property
by claiming an exemption of the.full value, and the trustee did
not object within the 30-day timeframe, the debtor was entitled to
the property in its entirety.'9 8
The Third Circuit rejected the argument by Schwab and
amicus National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees that Taylor
was not applicable in this case because Reilly's exemption was
not prima facie objectionable." According to Schwab, the
amount of the exemption that Reilly claimed was proper, which
distinguished this case from Taylor because "as opposed to trustee
Taylor, the trustee here could not have made a valid objection
under section 522(1) to this exemption."2 00 Thus, Schwab argued,
Taylor did not address whether a debtor's valuation of property
becomes conclusive in the absence of a timely objection pursuant
to section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b).2 0'
The Third Circuit disagreed with Schwab's argument and
found that Taylor controlled the case.202 Just as it perceived that
it was important to the Taylor Court that the debtor meant to
exempt the full amount. of property by listing "unknown" as both
the value of the property and the value of the exemption, the
Third Circuit held that it was important that Reilly valued the
business equipment at $10,718 and claimed an exemption in the
same amount.20 3  The Third Circuit reasoned that such an
identical listing clearly put Schwab on notice that Reilly intended
195 Id.
196 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2008).
197 Id.
"1 Id. at 179.
199 Id. at 177.
20 Id. at 177-78; see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 164, at 15-18.
201 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 177.
202 Id. at 178.
203 Id.
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to fully exempt the property.20 Furthermore, the Third Circuit
held that an unstated premise of Taylor was "that a debtor who
exempts the entire reported value of an asset is claiming that 'full
amount,' whatever it turns out to be." 205 In other words, when a
debtor equates the total value of an exemption with its estimated
market value, the debtor demonstrates the intention to exempt
the entirety of the property he claims as exempt.2 06
In reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit admitted that
there was a circuit split on the issue of whether section 522(1) and
Rule 4003(b) required a trustee to object to claimed exemptions
when a debtor signaled his intention to exempt the entire value of
the property but did not list the true market value.2 0 In reaching
its conclusion, the Third Circuit distinguished the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in Hyman v. Plotkin,20 8 noting that the debtors in Hyman
- who listed "homestead" as an exemption and attempted to
claim an exemption in their entire house - did not signal their
intent to exempt the entire property in question, whereas Reilly
and the debtor in Taylor did.209  The Third Circuit further
disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's holding in Stoebner v.
Wick,210 - a case where a debtor claimed an exemption in stocks
and listed their value as "unknown" - criticizing it as
inconsistent with Taylor.21 1 Instead, the Third Circuit sided with
holdings in the Sixth2 12 and Eleventh Circuits,2 13 which both ruled
204 Id.
20s Id. at 178-79; but see Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2010)
(clarifying that Taylor does not, in fact, rest on this premise).
206 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 179.
207 Id. at 173.
208 967 F.2d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that: (1) by listing
"homestead" instead of "homestead exemption" on schedules, debtors did not
claim as exempt entire homestead, rather than just $45,000 limit allowable
under California law, and thus, entire property was not automatically exempt
due to trustee's failure to object to schedules; (2) there was no statutory
requirement under California law that sale price of homestead also account for
selling costs; (3) trustee was not required to'demonstrate in advance of
attempting sale that market price would exceed all costs and encumbrances;
and (4) debtors were not entitled to post-filing appreciation).
209 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 172.
210 276 F.3d 412, 418 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a lack of objection by a
trustee to a debtor's claim of exemption in her stock option of "unknown"
value did not transform debtor's exemption from one for specific dollar
amount to one for entire asset).
211 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 173.
212 Olson v. Anderson, 377 B.R. 865, 370 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) (holding
that by scheduling property that they jointly owned with non-debtor co-
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that a debtor was entitled to keep his property if a trustee failed
to object to the debtor's estimation of that property value within
the designated 30-day timeframe.214
E. The Justices Weigh In: Reversing the Third Circuit's Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
federal circuit split of: 1) whether a debtor gets to keep the full
value of property when he undervalues the monetary value (and
the true value exceeds statutory limits); and 2) whether the trustee
is required to object to such a valuation within 30 days to retain
the excess value for creditors. 2 15  The Court rejected the Third
Circuit's reasoning and found that Schwab was not required to
object to Reilly's claimed exemptions within 30 days in order to
preserve for the bankruptcy estate any value in the equipment
beyond the value she claimed as exempt.2 16 The Court's decision
has three main components. 2 17 First, the Court evaluated Reilly's
Schedule C and clarified the meaning of section 522(1).218 Second,
the Court distinguished Schwab from Taylor and clarified its
holding in Taylor.2 19  Third, the Court quelled concerns about
trustee power and suggested ways a debtor could clearly signify
his intention to fully exempt his property on a bankruptcy
owners as having "total value of about $30,000," and by claiming $15,000
exemption for their one-half interest in property, debtors sufficiently
manifested their intent to exempt their full interest in property, so that where
trustee failed to timely object, debtors' interest in property was removed from
estate, and trustee, upon belatedly discovering that property had value of
$60,000, had no interest in property that she could sell).
213 Allen v. Green, 31 F.3d 1098, 1101 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that when a
trustee failed to timely challenge debtor's valuation of personal injury lawsuit
or debtor's exemption claim, debtor was entitled to entire value of lawsuit,
whatever it turned out to be).
214 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 173.
215 Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010). Justice Thomas delivered the
opinion of the Court in a 6-3 decision, in which Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia,
Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito, and Justice Sotomayor joined. Justice Ginsburg
filed a dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer
joined. Id. The Court granted review of those two issues, but declined to hear
a claim that the Third Circuit Court acted unconstitutionally in supposedly
creating "new trustee duties" and authorizing "unlimited in-kind exemptions"
of a debtor's property. Id.
16 Id. at 2667.
217 Id. at 2660-69; see also infra Part III.D.1-3.
- See infra Part II.D.1.
219 See infra Part II.D.2.
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petition. 2 0
1. Interpreting Section 522(1)
Because all parties agreed that section 522(1) governed the
case, the Court initiated its analysis by interpreting section
522(l).221 In relevant part, section 522(1) required that the debtor
file "a list of property that the debtor claim[ed] as exempt under
subsection (b)," and that "unless a party in interest object[ed]...
property claimed as exempt . .. [was] exempt."22 2 The contested
statutory language, and what the Court set out to clarify, was
how to define "property claimed as exempt."2 23 While Reilly
favored a literal interpretation of the statute - exempt property
claims were exempt when not objected to - Schwab argued that
property should be defined as an "interest" in property not to
exceed a certain dollar amount, and any value beyond that
interest was not within the statutory scope.224
The Court ultimately agreed with Schwab that "property
claimed as exempt" was defined as an "interest" in exempt
property up to a certain dollar amount.2 5  To support this
conclusion, the Court pointed to language in other sections of the
Bankruptcy Code - specifically, section 522(d).226 Section 522(d)
provides twelve categories of property exemptions;227 the majority
220 See infra Part II.D.3.
221 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2659-60.
222 Id. at 2660 (citing 11 U.S.C. 522(1) (2005)).
223 Id. (stating that while the parties agreed that this case was governed by
§ 522(1), and that § 522(1) refers to Schedule C, the parties disagreed about
what information on Schedule C defines "property claimed as exempt" for
purposes of evaluating an exemption's propriety under § 522(1)).
224 Id. at 2661. According to Reilly, Schwab was required to treat the
estimate of market value she entered in column four of her Schedule C as part
of her claimed exemption in identifying the "property claimed as exempt"
under § 522(1). Id. Relying on this premise, Reilly argued that when she
equated the total value of her claimed exemptions in her kitchen equipment
with the equipment's current market value, she clearly demonstrated that the
"property claimed as exempt" included this full market value estimation,
whatever the true market value turned out to be. Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. To get to § 522(d), the Court examined the language in § 522(1) that
targeted the "list of property that the debtors claims as exempt under
subsection (b)." Id. Section 522(b) did not further define the "property claimed
as exempt," but it did refer only to property in yet another subsection -
subsection (d). Id. Thus, the Court turned its attention to § 522(d). Id.
227 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2010). Section 522(d) catalogs exemptions of two
types. Id. Most exemptions place a monetary limit on the value of the property
386 [Vol. 23:3
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of these categories define exemptible property as the debtor's
"interest" in that property up to a specified dollar amount.228 In
light of this statutory language, the Court held that the
Bankruptcy Code's definition of "property claimed as exempt"
was clearly defined as an interest.229 Given this definition, the
Court agreed with Schwab that he had no duty to object to
Reilly's business equipment exemption because the stated value
of the "interest" was within Bankruptcy Code limits.2 3 0
The Court rejected Reilly's contention that the plain
language of section 522(1) and dictionary entries of "property,"
defined the phrase "property claimed as exempt" as property per
se.21 The Court stated that although it looked to dictionaries and
the Bankruptcy Rules to determine the meaning of words the
Bankruptcy Code did not define, in this instance the Bankruptcy
Code clearly defined "property" as an "interest" in section
522(d).23 2 Because this definition was unambiguous, the Court
found Reilly's plain language argument to be unpersuasive.23 3
In light of the Court's interpretation of section 552(1), the
Court further held that Schwab was not required to evaluate the
propriety of Reilly's current market value estimation. 23 4  The
Court found that Schwab was only required to object to
exemptions based on three (of a possible four) entries on Reilly's
the debtor may reclaim. See, e.g., id. § 522(d)(2) ("motor vehicle"); § 522(d)(3)
("household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books,
animals, crops, or musical instruments"); id. § 522(d)(4) ("jewelry"). For certain
exemptions not at issue here, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes reclamation of
the property in full without any cap on value. See, e.g., id. § 522(d)(7)
("unmatured life insurance contract"); §522(d)(9) ("[p]rofessionally prescribed
health aids"); id. § 522(d)(11)(A) ("award under a crime victim's reparation
law").
228 Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2010).
229 Id.
230.Id. (noting that Schwab's statutory duty to object to the exemptions in
this cases turned solely on whether the value of the property claimed as exempt
exceeded statutory limits because the parties agreed that Schwab had no cause
to object to Reilly's attempt to claim exemptions in the equipment at issue, or
to the applicability of the Code provisions Reilly cited in support of her
exemptions).
231 Id. at 2662.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 2665. In 1991, Schedule C was amended to include require
debtors to list the current market value of the exempt property. Id at 2664.
The Court noted that the precise reason for the amendment was unclear. Id at
2665 n.14. Whatever the case, the Court argued, it did not result from statutory
changes in the Bankruptcy Code provisions that governed this dispute. Id.
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Schedule C: 1) the description of the business equipment Reilly
claimed as exempt; 2) the Bankruptcy Code provisions governing
these exemptions; and 3) the value of the claimed exemption.23 5
Although Schedule C also required debtors to list a "market value
estimate," the Court held that Schwab was not entitled to
evaluate this category.23 6 Instead, the Court contended that this
category should be confined to its proper role: aiding the trustee
by helping him identify assets that may have value beyond the
dollar amount claimed as exempt.237 In effect, the Court held that'
when Reilly listed that her business equipment had a market
value of $10,718, Schwab had no legal duty to object because he
was not required to consider this information.23 8
2. Distinguishing Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz
After the Court determined that Schwab had no legal duty
to object to Reilly's valuation of her claimed exemptions, it
clarified its holding in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz.2 39 First, the
Court asserted that Taylor did. not rest on what the debtor
"meant" to exempt, but instead, the case rested on the face of a
debtor's claimed exemption.2 40 In Taylor, the face of the debtor's
exemption was not valid because she listed the value as
"unknown."2 4 1 In this case, the face of Reilly's claimed exemption
was valid, as $10,718 was within statutory limits. 24 2 Thus, the
Court argued that Reilly, unlike the Taylor debtor, raised no
"warning flag" warranting a trustee objection.2 43
231 Id. at 2663.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. However, the Court did not render his information entirely
superfluous. Id. at 2663. By confining the "full market value" category of
Schedule C to the role of aiding trustees, the Court claimed that trustees could
still use this information for their own knowledge. Id at 2664. This
interpretation, the Court argued, was consistent with the historical treatment
of bankruptcy exemptions. Id.2 1 Id. at 2665-67.
24o Id. at 2665.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 2666 n. 16. See, e.g., In re Barroso-Herrans, 524 F.3d 341, 345 (1st
Cir. P.R. 2008) (explaining that Schedule C entries listing the value of a
claimed exemption as "unknown" "to be determined" or "100%" are "red flags
to trustees to trustees and creditors," and therefore put them on notice that if
they do not object, the whole value of the asset - whatever it might later turn
out to be - will be exempt.").
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Furthermore, the Court rejected the Third Circuit's
contention that an "unstated premise" of Taylor was that "a
debtor who exempt[ed] the entire reported value of an asset
claim[ed] the 'full amount,' whatever it turns out to be."2 44 The
Court held that Taylor did not rest on this premise; rather, it
established and applied the straightforward proposition that an
interested party must object to a claimed exemption if the value
of a claimed exemption is not within statutory limits.245 In
accordance with this distinction, the Court ruled that Taylor
remained good law when the debtor exempts the full amount of
the property or lists the property value as "unknown," but it did
not extend to cases in which a debtor claimed exemptions and
assigned them values that fell within the limits permitted by the
Bankruptcy Code.246
3. Not Requiring a Trustee to Object Does Not Undermine the
"Fresh Start" or Create Incentives for Trustees to Sleep on Their
Rights
Next, the Court addressed Reilly's concern that Schwab's
argument was inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code's "fresh
start" principle.2 47  Addressing Reilly's argument that her
approach to section 522(1) was necessary to ensure the Code's goal
of giving debtors a fresh start, the Court stated that its decision
fully accorded with the fresh start policy.2 48 Though the Court
agreed that exemptions in bankruptcy cases are part of the fresh
start concept,249 it disagreed that this policy required Schwab to
object to a facially valid claim of exemption, stating that such an
approach would "threaten to convert a fresh start into a free
pass. "250
244 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2666. (citing In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 179).
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 2667-69.
248 Id. at 2667.
249 Id. (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 57, at 21).
210 Id. at 2667. To further support its claim, the Court emphasized its
holding in Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (2005). In Rousey, the Court
emphasized "[t]o help the debtor obtain a fresh start the Bankruptcy Court
permits him to withdraw from the estate certain interests in property, such as
his car or home, up to certain values." Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2667 (citing
Rousey, 544 U.S. at 325 (emphasis added)). The Court argued that Congress
imposed exemption limits, and it was not up to the Court alter this balance by
requiring trustees to object to claimed exemptions based on form entries
3892011]
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The Court also addressed Reilly's contention that
Schwab's approach created perverse incentives for trustees and
creditors to sleep on their rights and object when property values
appreciated. 25 1 The Court argued its holding did not create this
effect, but instead provided a clear and effective resolution for
debtors wishing to claim nothing more than a dollar-amount
interest in a claimed exemption.2 52 Indeed, the Court held that
the rule was simple: if a debtor claimed an interest up to a certain
dollar amount and a trustee failed to object to that claimed
exemption, the debtor would be guaranteed payment in the dollar
amount of the exemption.2 53 If the trustee objected in a timely
manner, the court would rule on the objection and, if improper,
allow the debtor to adjust accordingly.254
To further clarify its holding, the Court offered several
ways a debtor may signal his intention to fully exempt an asset
without risking trustee confusion. 255 For example, by listing "full
market value (FMV)" or "100% of FMV," in the fourth column of
a debtor's Schedule C, a debtor could clearly indicate his wish to
exempt the full value of his property.256 The Court contended
that such a clear declaration would encourage trustees to object
promptly to the exemption if he wished to challenge its true
market value. 257  The Court concluded that using "FMV" or
"100% of FMV" facilitated the expeditious and final disposition
of assets and thus, enabled debtors to achieve a fresh start free of
the concerns Reilly expressed.25 8
beyond those that govern an exemption's validity under the Bankruptcy Code.
251 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2667 (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 57,
at 64).
252 Brief for Respondent, supra note 57, at 5.
25 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2667. ,
254 Id. at 2667-68. The Court also disagreed that Reilly's approach to
exemptions would more efficiently dispose of competing claims to the asset,
and held that it would engender needless objections and litigation. Id. at 2668
n. 18.
255 Id. at 2668.
256 Id.
25 Id. The Court noted that trustees would not always file an objection to
questionable valuations, especially with respect to assets that cannot be readily
sold. Id. 2668 at n.20.
2ss Id. at 2668 (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 57, at 57-59).
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4. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent: Advocating the Third Circuit's
Approach
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Breyer, wrote a dissenting opinion.259 She argued that the
majority decision drastically reduced Rule 4003's governance and
exposed debtors to protracted uncertainty concerning their right
to retain exempt property, thereby impeding the "fresh start" that
exemptions were designed to foster.26 0  She noted that the
bankruptcy court, the district court, the Third Circuit, and the
leading treatise on bankruptcy were all in accord with her
view.261
Justice Ginsburg held that Reilly, by her precise
specification of $10,718 as both the current market value of her
kitchen equipment and the value of the claimed exemptions, had
made her position plain: She claimed as exempt the listed
property itself-not the dollar amount, up to $10,718,.that sale of
the property by Schwab might yield.262 Because neither Schwab
nor any creditor lodged a timely objection, Reilly's kitchen
equipment became exempt, and was therefore, outside the
259 Id. at 2669.
260 Id. at 2670 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). The Court rejected Justice
Ginsburg's assertion that its holding "drastically reduce[d] Rule. 4003's
governance." Id. at 2663 n.8 (majority opinion). The Court argued that Rule
4003(b) never governed challenged the valuation of "exemptible assets" in the
first place. Id. Instead, the Court found that Rule 4003(b) governed objections
to "property claimed as exempt" only to the extent that such property is, in
fact, objectionable. Id.
261 Id. at 2672 (Ginsburg J. dissenting). To support her assertion that her
views are in accord with the leading treatise on bankruptcy, Justice Ginsburg
cited the following excerpt from COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY:
Normally, if the debtor lists property as exempt, that listing is .
interpreted as a claim for exemption of the debtor's entire interest
in the property, and the debtor's valuation of that interest is treated
as the amount of the exemption claimed. Were it otherwise - that
is, if the listing were construed to claim as exempt only that portion
of the property having the value stated - the provisions finalizing
exemptions if no objections are filed would be rendered
meaningless. The trustee or creditors could [anytime] claim that the
debtor's interest in the property was greater than the value claimed
as exempt and [then] object to the debtor exempting his entire
interest in the property after the deadline for objections had passed.
9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 4003.02 pp. 4004-05 (15th ed. 1996).
262 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2670 (2010) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
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bankruptcy estate.2 63
. Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority's view-that
the market value of a claimed exemption is not relevant in
determining the "property claimed as exempt" for purposes of
Rule 4003(b)'s designated 30-day objection timeframe-ignored
the important role played by the exemption's market value. in
determining the debtor's intentions.2 64 Justice Ginsburg
contended that a debtor who estimates a market value below the
statutory limit and lists an identical amount as the value of his
claimed exemption, thereby signals an intention to keep the
property in his possession.265 Alternatively, Justice Ginsburg
noted that a debtor who estimates a value above the statutory
limit and above the value of his claimed exemption, thereby
recognizes that he cannot shelter the property, and that the
trustee may seek to sell it for whatever it is worth.2 6 6 Here, the
market value was thus significant because it alerted the trustee as
to whether the debtor was claiming a right to retain the listed
property, or the debtor knew he was at risk of losing it to the
bankruptcy estate if a trustee objected in a timely manner.2 67
Justice Ginsburg also argued that the majority's holding
undermined the debtor's fresh start and casted a "cloud of
uncertainty" around what assets the debtor would ultimately be
allowed to keep.2 68 By permitting trustees to challenge a debtor's
valuation of exempted property anytime before discharge, Justice
Ginsburg reasoned that the debtor was denied the benefit of
closure and therefore, left with a looming fear that a trustee may
seek to repossess the asset or auction it off and then hand the
263 Id.
264 Id. at 2673 n.6.
265 Id. at 2673.
266 Id.
267 Id. The Court held that this assertion lacked statutory support because
the governing Bankruptcy Code provisions phrased the exemption limit as a
simple dollar amount. See id. at n. 11.
268 Id. at 2674. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court responded to the
dissent's "clouded-title" argument by reiterating that it only arose if one
accepted Reilly's "flawed conception of the exemptions in this case." Id. at n.21
(majority opinion). The Court took issue with the Reilly's assertion that she
was "entitled to know that she would emerge from bankruptcy with her
cooking equipment intact." Id. (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 57, at
57). In contrast, the Court argued that Reilly was not "entitled" to her
equipment, but was only entitled to a payment equal to the equipment's
claimed value. Id. at n.2 1. The Court acknowledged that trustees often pass
title in exempted property to debtors, but the Court underscored that such a
practice does not establish the statutory entitlement Reilly claimed. Id.
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debtor a check for a dollar amount of the claimed exemption. 269
Justice Ginsburg addressed the majority's suggestion that
requiring timely objections to a debtor's valuation would saddle
the trustees with an unmanageable load.270 She noted that
trustees sooner or later must attempt to ascertain the market
value of exempted assets.271 Thus, Justice Ginsburg argued that
removing valuation from the Rule 4003(b) 30-day timeframe did
not substantially reduce the trustee's duties, nor did it impose
additional duties. 27 2 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
if the debtor's estimate significantly undervalued his claimed
exemption, trustees were well situated to recognize and dispute a
claimed exemption as procedures were already in place to handle
valuation problems.273 Furthermore, she noted that debtors were
already deterred from intentionally undervaluing their exempted
assets because doing so would expose them to judicial sanction
and liability for perjury or fraud.274
Finally, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority's
suggestion that a debtor could make her intention to claim the
full amount of an exemption clear by writing "full fair market
value (FMV)" or "100% of FMV" in Schedule C's value-of-
claimed-exemption column.2 75 She articulated that although a
debtor's schedules must sufficiently alert the trustee that an
objection may be in order, the means to this end could vary.2 7 6
To Justice Ginsburg, the majority was misguided in its assertion
that Reilly did not sufficiently demonstrate an intention to
exempt her entire property by listing identical amounts of $10,718
as both the current market value and the value of her claimed
exemptions.277 Surely, Justice Ginsburg argued, listing identical
26 Id. at 2674-75 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). To illustrate this point, Justice
Ginsburg offered the example of a debtor who believes her car is exempt, and
thus accepts a job not within walking distance. Id. at 2674.
270 Id. at 2675.
271 Id.
272 Id. Like other claims-processing rules, the objections it regulates "can
... be forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point."
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004).
273 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2675-76 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (noting that if
the trustee entertains any doubt about the accuracy of a debtor's estimation of
market value, the procedure for interposing objections was hardly arduous -
the trustee need only file with the court a simple declaration stating that an
item's value exceeds the amount listed by the debtor).
274 Id. at 2677.
275 Id. at 2676.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 2677.
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amounts was the logical equivalent of writing $10,718 as the
current market value of an asset and then writing "100% of
FMV" as the market value of that claimed exemption.27 8  The
majority's suggestion was nonsensical given the wording of
Schedule C, which instructed debtors to "state the dollar value of
the claimed exemption in the space provided."27 9 Given the fact
that Chapter 7 debtors are often unrepresented, Justice Ginsburg
questioned how debtors would know to ignore Schedule C's
instructions to list the dollar value and instead list "FMV" or
"100% of FMV" if they wished to trigger the trustee's obligation
to object to their market valuation in a timely fashion.280 justice
Ginsburg further argued that such a requirement did not align
with the plain wording of Schedule C's instructions.2 8 1
III. Analysis
Undoubtedly, the Schwab holding clarified the trustee's
duty in cases where a debtor's claimed exemption value is
identical to his valuation of a particular asset.2 82  The Court's
holding also suggested clear language that a debtor can use to
signal his intentions to fully exempt an asset without risking
trustee confusion.2 83 However, this Part argues that the Court's
decision has certain negative consequences. 28 4  First, this Part
278 Id. The Court responded to the dissent's contention that Reilly clearly
intended to exempt the full amount by stating that just because the evidence
demonstrated that Reilly would have chosen this course, her true intentions
were external to her exemption schedule. Id. at n.11 (majority opinion).
279 Id. at 2677 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (citing FED. R. BKRcY. PROC.
Official Form 6, Schedule C, Instruction 5 (1991)).
280 Id.
281 Id. (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). The Court responded to Justice Ginsburg's
observations about the poor fit between the Court's holding and a form calling
for a dollar amount. Id. at 2668, n.19 (majority opinion). The Court asserted
that this tension only further reflected the tension between the Bankruptcy
Code's definition of "property claimed as exempt" and Reilly's attempt to
convert into a dollar value an improper claim to exempt the equipment itself.
Id. (majority opinion).
282 Id. at 2669 ("Where, as here, a debtor accurately describes an asset
subject to an exempt interest and on Schedule C declares the "value of [the]
claimed exemption" as a dollar amount within the range the Code allows,
interested parties are entitled to rely upon that value as evidence of the claim's
validity.").
2 Id. at 2668 (suggesting that a debtor can make her intentions to exempt
the full market value of the asset or the asset itself known by listing "full fair
market value (FMV)" or "100% of FMV.").
28 See infra Part II.A-D.
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argues that the Court's definition of "property" in section 522(1)
ignored the, plain meaning of the statute and disregarded a
common sense reading of Schedule C that will likely leave
debtors unsecure about their claimed assets.2 85 This Part then
argues that the Schwab standard will lead to trustee abuse and
valuation problems. 28 6 Finally, this Part asserts that the Schwab
decision raises policy concerns,2 87 and that the Supreme Court
should have affirmed the Third Circuit's judgment. 288
A. The Schwab Court Ignored a Plain Reading of Section 522(1)
and Schedule C
First, by relying on the language of other sections of the
Bankruptcy Code to define "property" in section 522(1), the
Supreme Court ignored the statute's plain meaning and thus,
incorrectly held that Reilly did not claim an exemption in the full
market value of her business equipment. 28 9 By interpreting the
word "property" to mean "interest" in section 522(1), the Court
reasoned that the 4003(b) timeframe did not apply to Schwab - a
trustee, after all, is only required to object to property claimed as
exempt, not to a facially valid dollar value interest in that
property.29 0 Had Reilly made her intentions clear, for example,
by writing "Full Market Value" or "100% of Full Market Value,"
the Court held that Schwab would have known to object within
30 days.291 By equating the value of her asset and her claimed
exemption, however, the Court argued that Reilly only signaled
an intention to retain a $10,718 interest in her kitchen equipment,
and thus Schwab was not required to object to preserve the
estate's right to retain any value on the equipment beyond that
dollar value interest. 29 2
The Court's entire analysis hinges on an improper
285 See infra Part III.A.
286 See infra Part III.B.
287 See infra Part Ill*.C.
288 See infra Part II.D.
289 See Brief for Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, supra note 5, at 5
(arguing that Schwab's argument should be rejected based on a common-sense
interpretation of § 522(1)); see also Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2672 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the language of section 522(1) "should [have been]
dispositive of this case.").
290 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2669 (2010).
291 Id. at 2668.
292 Id. at 2668 n.19.
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interpretation of the word "property" in section 522(1).293 Instead
of accepting a- literal reading of 522(1), which unambiguously
states "property claimed as exempt on [Schedule C] is exempt,"
the Court reasoned that the constructive (and true) definition of
"property" under the Bankruptcy Code was found in subsection
(d).294 Subsection (d), which lists twelve categories of exemptions,
defines some of these categories as a debtor's "aggregate interest"
not to exceed a certain dollar amount in certain types of
property.2 9 5 The Court held that, because subsection (d) so clearly
defined property as an "interest," and not as property itself, the
Bankruptcy Code's definition of "property" in this case was
sufficiently clear.296
However, by using the language of section 522(d) to define
"property" in section 522(1), the Court ignored the plain meaning
of the statute and disregarded its own existing definitions of the
word "property." 29 7 Normally, when a court construes or applies
the Bankruptcy Code, the plain language of the text is the
starting point.29 8 If the language is plain, a court's sole function is
to enforce the language according to its terms.2 99 If the plain
meaning of a word comports with the common dictionary
definition of that word, and the statute's context does not suggest
another meaning, the plain meaning should stand.3 "
293 Brief for Respondent, supra note 57, at 21-31 (arguing that Schwab
presented a "manifestly implausible" reading of § 522(1)).
294 See infra Part II.D.1. 
.
295 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) (2010) ("The following property may be
exempted . .. The debtor's interest, not to exceed $3450 in value, in one motor
vehicle).
296 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661.
297 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 57, at 21-31 (citing cases where the
Court has defined property as an entity onto itself). See, e.g., Dickman v.
C.I.R., 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984) ("Property" is more than just the physical
thing. . . It is the tangible and the intangible.").
298 See Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) ("The
starting point.. .is the existing statutory text.").
299 See Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 522,
563 (1990) ("We will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy
practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure); see
also Connecticut Nat'1 Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (noting that,
when a court interprets a statute, a cardinal presumption is that Congress
"says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.").
" See, e.g., Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 325 (2005) (interpreting the
phrase "on account of" to mean "because of' in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
manner because it was found elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code and it
comported the common understanding of the phrase, as supported by its
dictionary definition). In Schwab, the Court noted that although it may look to
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In this case, the plain meaning of the term "property" is
the property itself - not an. "interest" in the property. 0' This
definition is in accord with the dictionary definition, which
defines property as "something owned or possessed" or
"something to which a person has legal title,"3 0 2 and is consistent
with previous Supreme Court holdings.3 03 In Dickman v. C.I.R.,
for example, the Court rejected the theory that a money interest
in property is a separate interest from tangible property itself and
held that "property" meant both the thing itself and all of the
"intangible elements" that go along with it.3 04 Using the Court's
own definition, the plain meaning of "property claimed as exempt
in [Schedule C] is exempt" is clear: property includes the exempt
property itself.3 0s In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg supported this
common sense, literal reading, and argued that the plain meaning
of the section 522(1) should have been dispositive of this case.3 06
Aside from ignoring the plain meaning of the statute, the
Schwab holding also disregarded a common sense reading of
dictionaries and the Bankruptcy Rules to determine the meaning of words the
Bankruptcy Code does not define, the Bankruptcy Code's definition in this
case was clear because § 522(d) defined "property" as an "interest." Schwab,
130 S. Ct. at 2662.
30' Brief for Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing
that Schwab's argument should be rejected based on a common-sense
interpretation of § 522(1)).
302 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 943 (9th ed. 1984).
303 See, e.g., Dickman v. C.I.R., 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984) (defining property
to mean both the property itself and the money interest in the property);
United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (Describing property as a
'bundle of sticks' - a collection of individual rights which, in certain
combinations, constitute property).
304 The Court stated:
Property is more than just the physical thing-the land, the
bricks, the mortar - it is also the sum of all the rights and
powers incident to ownership of the physical thing. It is the
tangible and the intangible. Property is composed of
constituent elements and of these elements the right to use the
physical thing to the exclusion of others is the most essential
and beneficial. Without this right all other elements would be
of little value.
Dickman, 465 U.S. at 336 (1984) (quoting Passailaigue v. United
States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (MD Ga. 1963)).
305 Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
306 Id.
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Schedule C.31o When a debtor fills out his Schedule C list of
claimed exemptions, there are four columns to fill out: 1) a
description of the property claimed as exempt; 2) the law
governing the claimed exemption; 3) the value of the current
exemption; and 4) the current market value of the property.os
Though Schedule C clearly lists four columns, the Court held that
Schwab was only obligated to inspect categories one through
three when he determined the propriety of Reilly's claimed
exemption.3 09 The fourth category, the Court prescribed, should
be confined to its proper role: aiding the trustee in administering
the bankruptcy estate by helping him or her identify assets that
may have value beyond the dollar amount the debtor has claimed
as exempt.3 10
By demoting Schedule C's "current market value" column
from a legally enforceable portion of a debtor's Schedule C to a
useful tool for trustees with minimal legal significance, the Court
undermined its integral role in making a debtor's intentions
known to a trustee.3 1  For example, if a statute permits a debtor
30' Brief for Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, supra note 5, at 10-11
(contending that Schedule C requires a statement of the asset's current total
value - not "the portion of the exempt asset claimed as exempt.").
308 FED. R. BANKR. P. Form 6, Schedule C (2005). The Official Form
entitled "Schedule C - Property Claimed As Exempt" is the "list of property
claimed as exempt." Id. This form requires a debtor to make four specific
entries for each asset claimed as exempt: (i) describe the property claimed as
exempt, (ii) specify the law which serves as the basis for the exemption, (iii)
state the value of the claimed exemption and (iv) state the current value of
property without deducting [the] exemption. Id.
30I Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2663.
3 0 Id. at 2663. (citing Brief for the U.S. Trustees as Amicus Curiae
supporting Petitioner at 16, Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010) (No. 08-
538). In support of its view that market value is not relevant to determining
the "property claimed as exempt" for purposes of Rule 4003(b)'s timely
objection mandate, the Court noted that Schedule C did not require the debtor
to list its current market value until 1991. Id. at 2664-65. In her dissent,
however, Justice Ginsburg noted that debtors did have to record market value
prior to 1991, just on a different schedule. Id. at 2673 n.6 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Therefore, she argued, trustees have always been faced with the
task of comparing the value of a claimed exemption to a property's declared
market value. Id. at n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 2673-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court's account ...
shuts from sight the vital part played by the fourth entry on Schedule C -
current market value - when a capped exemption. is claimed."); see also 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 522.05 p. 5 22-33 (15 ed. 2005) ("[T]o evaluate the
propriety of the debtor's claim of exemptions, trustees need the information on
all four columns of Schedule C . . . market value is essential to judging whether
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to exempt $2,400 in the value of her car, and the debtor estimates
the current market value to be $2,000, the debtor thereby signals
her intention to keep her car if a trustee does not file a timely
objection. 12 In contrast, if that same debtor estimates her car to
be worth $5,000, she would thereby signal her knowledge that she
cannot keep the car as well as her recognition that the trustee
may seek to sell the car for whatever it is worth.1 In other
words, the fourth column alerts the trustee to whether the debtor
is claiming a right to retain a claimed exemption if no objection is
filed.3 14
The Court's interpretation of Schedule C not only
disregards its intended purpose, but it also falsely assumes that
Schedule C requires a debtor to state what portion of an asset's
total value a debtor wishes to claim as exempt, when the plain
language unambiguously requires a debtor to state the total value
of the asset he wished to claim as exempt.31s The Court held that
Schwab had no reason to object to Reilly's Schedule C because
the exemption amount was within statutory limits. 16 As such, the
fact that the kitchen equipment's actual value was higher than
what Reilly listed was inconsequential because Reilly was only
required to list the value of the exemption, not the asset.317
However, such an interpretation ignores what the plain language
the claim is proper because exemption provisions often are limited according to
... [the property's] value.").
312 See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2673 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (citing In re
Price, 370 F.3d 362, 378 (3d Cir. 2004)).
"1 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(9) (2010)
(not limiting a debtor's right to fully exempt any health aids).
314 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2673. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
31s Brief for Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, supra note 5, at 11
(contending that Schedule C requires a statement of the asset's current total
value-not "the portion of the exempt asset claimed as exempt."). A leading
treatise on bankruptcy law identifies this problem:
[If]f the listing were construed to claim as exempt only that
portion of the property having the value stated-the
provisions finalizing exemptions if no objections are filed
would be rendered meaningless. The Trustee or creditors
could always claim that the debtor's interest in the property
was greater than the value claimed as exempt and effectively
still object to the debtor exempting his or her entire interest in
the property after the deadline for objections had passed.
9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 4003.02[1] (15th ed. 1996).
3' Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2664.
3 Id.
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of Schedule C clearly requires: a statement of the asset's current
total value without deducting the exemption amount - and not
"the portion of the exempt asset claimed as exempt." 31 Thus, by
construing Schedule C to mean that a debtor only claims an
exemption in a portion of his claimed exemption (instead of the
entire asset), the Court effectively eliminated a trustee's deadline
for challenging exemptions.3 9 Framed this way, a trustee or
creditor can always claim that the debtor's interest in the
property is greater than the value claimed as exempt and thus,
under the new Schwab standard, object to the value of an
exemption at any point during a bankruptcy proceeding. 32 0
B. Potential for Abuse
After Schwab, valuation problems are likely to arise in a
large number of Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. 321 Trustees are
newly empowered to challenge a debtor's exemption valuations
at any point during a bankruptcy proceeding.32 2 This issue is
problematic in light of the- fact that a debtor must list the current
market value of a claimed exemption the day he files for
bankruptcy, and objections to value are the most common. type of
trustee objection.32 3 To the extent that Chapter 7 cases can take
months, even years, property values will inevitably be subject to
changes caused by market fluctuations, inflated interest rates,
and general economic factors.3 24 After Schwab, a trustee has an
as See SOMMER, supra note 100, at 82 ("a fair reading of other schedules
listing the same amount as the total value of the debtor's interest in the
property makes clear that the debtor indeed does intend to claim as exempt the
total value of the interest").
3" 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 4003.03[1][a] (15th ed. 1996).
320 See In re Gebhart, 621 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (court refusing to
rule on whether equitable estoppel was a permissible remedy if a trustee left a
case open longer than necessary to reclaim a higher value on the debtor's
property exemption).
" See In re Crump, 2 B.R. 222, 224 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that
that value and the status of exempt property was determined on the date the
petition was filed).
322 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 164, at 32 (noting that although
Chapter 7 cases generally move quickly, cases in which there are assets to
administer can take one to four years to complete).
323 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (2010). SOMMER, supra note 100, at 76 ("The value
[of a claimed exemption] should be determined the date the petition was filed");
1-13 COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE 13.08[4] (16th ed.
2009) (stating that valuation issues are prominent in hearings on objections).
324 In re Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1212.
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incentive to sit on his rights, wait to see if property values to
appreciate, and then object at a later point in the bankruptcy
proceeding."' This new trustee advantage promulgated by the
Schwab holding contradicts with commonly held bankruptcy
principles32 6 and overrules decades of case law.'
In response to these concerns, the Court suggested that a
debtor could write "full market value (FMV)" or "100% of FMV"
to make the scope of his exemption clear and thus, avoid the risk
of losing his property at a later point in the bankruptcy
proceedings.3 28 Such a signal, the Court reasoned, raised the
necessary "warning flag" to a trustee that a debtor intended to
exempt his property entirely.329 By creating this new standard,
however, the Court ignored the reality that debtors make their
intentions known in different ways and that listing identical
values for the same property on Schedule B and C is common.o
If a debtor wished to fully exempt her car - worth $2,000, for
example - writing "100% of full market value" is the logical
equivalent of simply writing $2,000 because, to the debtor, $2,000
is 100% of the full market value.' The Schwab court, in
3.. See 1-13 COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE 13.08
(16th ed. 2009) (stating that valuation issues will are prominent in hearings on
objections).
326 See SOMMER, supra note 100, at 82 (explaining the old standard by
stating, "any appreciation since [the date of filing] should be considered
property acquired post-petition that is not a part of the [bankruptcy] estate."
(emphasis added)).
327 See, e.g., In re Rappaport 19 B.R. 971, 973 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)
(debtors were entitled to benefit from any appreciation in property value after
filing of their Chapter 7 petition); In re Finn, 151 B.R. 25, 27 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1990) (property valued as of filing date for lien avoidance purposes);
but see In re Hyman, 967 F.2d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1992) (when debtor's
interest was not totally exempt at time of petition, appreciation could not be
exempted).
"2 Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2010).
329 Id.; see also In re Barroso-Herrans, 524 F. 3d 341, 345 (1st Cir. 2008)
(explaining that Schedule C entries listing the value of a claimed exemption as
"unknown," "to be determined," or "100%" are "'red flags to trustees and
creditors,' (citation omitted) and therefore put them on notice that if they do
not object, the whole value of the asset-whatever it might later turn out to
be-will be exempt" (quoting 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5 8.06(1)(c)(ii) (15th
ed. rev. 2007)).
330 See SOMMER, supra note 100, at 81 ("Most often, the value given in
Schedule C for the exemption equals the value given in Schedules A and B,
except the lien amounts can and should be deducted.").
'3 See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 4003.03[3] (15th ed. 1996) ("Only
when a debtor's schedules specifically value the debtor's interest in the
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creating an artificial legal distinction -between two facially
equivalent manners of claiming an exemption, unduly vests the
trustee with objection powers beyond the designated 30-day
objection period."'
Moreover, in prescribing debtors to write "100% of FMV,"
the Court overlooks the debtor's plight to claim exemptions.13 3
As noted above, Schedule C directs debtors to "state the dollar
value of the claimed exemption in the space provided."3 4  In
Justice Ginsburg's dissent, she aptly stated how it was
nonsensical for debtors to list "100% of FMV" when they are
plainly asked to state the dollar value of the claimed exemption.33 1
Such a counterintuitive requirement, Justice Ginsburg reasoned,
was particularly unfair to the large number of Chapter 7 debtors
that filed without legal representation. 6 Justice Ginsburg
argued that asking unrepresented debtors to ignore Schedule C's
plain instructions and employ the new Schwab rule unduly favors
the trustee.
C. Policy Concerns: Undermining Chapter 7 Deadlines and the
Debtor's "Fresh Start"
After Schwab, there is no time limit in which a trustee can
challenge a debtor's valuation of his exempt property. 38  This
open-ended trustee timeframe is inconsistent with the basic
structure and purpose of Chapter 7.* Chapter 7 cases, by
statutory design, move quickly;3 40 because Chapter 7 cases are by
far the most common form of individual bankruptcy, Congress
created deadlines to promote efficiency, prompt party action, and
property at an amount higher than the amount claimed as exempt can it be
argued that a part of the debtor's interest in property has not been exempted."
(emphasis added)).
33 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652
(2010) (No. 08-538).
3 Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2677 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id.
3 Id.
338 See Tamara Miles Ogier, Trustee Talk: Schwab v. Reilly, A Win-Win
Decision, 68 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38, 39-40, 68 (Sept. 2010) (discussing why the
open-ended objection deadline is a "win" for trustees).
3 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001. These rules "shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding."
340 Brief for Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, supra note 5, at 24.
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produce finality.3 4 1 Due to these strict deadlines, most individual
bankruptcies are concluded within just 120 days.3 42  After
Schwab, however, unnecessary litigation and delay are likely to
occur because the number of valuation objections will increase
and motions to extend the time for objecting to exemptions will
become standard practice.3 43 To the extent that Chapter 7 cases
are designed to move rapidly, the Schwab holding thwarts the
Bankruptcy Code's statutory framework by delaying the closure
and resolution of cases.34 4
As the Court has long recognized, the policy of affording
the "honest but unfortunate" debtor a "fresh start" is one of the
Bankruptcy Code's most fundamental themes.3 45  The Schwab
holding, by permitting an open-ended timeframe for trustees to
challenge a debtor's valuation of exempt property, leaves debtors
unsecure about which assets they will keep after bankruptcy and
thus, undermines the fresh start policy. 346 If a trustee is able to
attack exemptions for an extended period of time, the Court casts
a "cloud of uncertainty" over the debtor's use of assets reclaimed
in full.347  If the trustee gains a different opinion of an item's
value at any point during the course of a debtor's bankruptcy, the
Schwab holding permits a trustee to repossess the asset, auction it
off, and give the debtor the money value of his claimed exemption
instead of the exempt property itself.34 8 With this threat looming
341 See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992).
342 The Administration of the United States Courts, 2009 Report of
Statistics Required by BAPCPA, 6, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2009/2009BAPCPA.pdf (last visited
Nov. 5, 2010). Of the 880,654 Chapter 7 consumer cases closed in 2009, the
mean time interval from filing to disposition was 168 days, and the median
time interval was 120 days. Id.; see also Brief for Consumer Bankruptcy
Attorneys, supra note 5, at 22 (offering 120 days as the average lifespan of a
Chapter 7 proceeding based on deadlines imposed by the Bankruptcy Code
and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy).
34 See Brief for Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, supra note 5, at 37.
344 See id. at 24.
34 See In re Reilly, F.3d at 180 (noting that once the objection period
lapses, "all parties involved know what property belongs to the bankruptcy
estate and what remains with the debtor."); Marrama v. Citizens Bank of
Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) ("The principal purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code is to grant a 'fresh start' to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor."');
Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) (Bankruptcy provisions "must
be construed" in light of policy "to give the bankrupt" a fresh start.).
346 See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 4003-9 (15th ed. 1996).
34 Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
348 Id. Although Chapter 7 cases generally move quickly, cases in which
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until a case is closed, the Court's open-ended construction of
section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) hinders a debtor's ability to
restructure his affairs.34 9
D. The Supreme Court Should Have Adopted the Third
Circuit's Judgment
The Court's decision should have achieved two main
goals: (1) adopt a known and workable standard; and (2) facilitate
a debtor's fresh start.350  The Third Circuit's judgment,
reinforced by Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Schwab, achieves
these two aims. 51 First, the Third Circuit ruled in a manner that
accorded with the common sense reading of section 522(1), Rule
4003(b), and Schedule C.35 2 At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg
expressed that the Third Circuit's literal interpretation - namely
that when a trustee questions the value of a claimed exemption,
he must object within 30 days or the debtor keeps the property -
served as a clear, workable standard to both debtors and
creditors alike.353 Such a comprehensible rule serves as an
unambiguous guideline for -all parties, and aligns with the fast-
paced nature of Chapter 7 cases.354
Second, the Third Circuit ruled in way that facilitated a
fresh start for the debtor.ss In interpreting laws involving
consumer debtors, the fresh start is "by far" the most significant
consideration because there are typically few assets to be
distributed to the creditors involved. 3 5 6
In accordance with this policy consideration, courts should
there are assets to administer can take one to four years to complete. Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 164 at 32.
349 Schwab, S. Ct. at 2674 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, supra note 5, at 2-3). See In re Polis, 217
F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2000).
310 See SOMMER, supra note 100, at 82 (describing the dual aims of any
new bankruptcy standard).
351 See In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 180.
351 See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2677 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
3 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, supra note 332, at 5.
354 See SOMMER, supra note 100, at 82 (discussing the importance of careful
attention to Schedule C, underscored by 11 U.S.C. §522(1) and stating "As there
is a strictly enforced deadline for objecting to exemptions, it is to the debtor's
advantage to be certain that all good faith exemptions. Such listing shifts the
burden to the trustee and creditors to raise timely objections if any are
available.").
s In re Reilly, 534 F. 3d at 180.
316 See SOMMER, supra note 100, at 82.
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adopt standards that will offer debtors "a new opportunity in life,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing
debt." 5  By construing Rule 4003(b)'s 30-day objection period
literally, the Third Circuit's approach provides debtors with the
security and assurance that they will keep certain property after a
bankruptcy."' By adhering to a strict construction of Rule
4003(b)'s 30-day timeframe, the Third Circuit accords with the
fresh start policy. 359
IV. Impact.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Schwab determined a
procedural point of the Bankruptcy Code, which will affect over
one million Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors each year.3 o As the.
importance of bankruptcy increases, so does the need for clear
and practical laws.361 Thus, attention must now turn to how the
majority's rule will affect Chapter 7 debtors. 362 First, this Part
explores strategic debtor strategies in the wake of the Schwab
decision.3 63 Then it examines a recent Ninth Circuit decision that
illustrates the ramifications of the Schwab holding.364 Overall,
this Part will demonstrate that by not requiring trustees to object
to the value of exemptions within the designated 30-day
timeframe, the Schwab decision is significant for any party with
an interest in a Chapter 7 debtor's claimed exemption.65
A. Debtor Strategies After Schwab
Despite the more debtor-conscious approach advocated by
Justice Ginsburg, the majority set forth a different standard. 66
The Court held that the 30-day objection rule would only apply
as' Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); see also H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 117 (1977) (holding that the debtor's fresh start is the "essence
of modern bankruptcy law").
158 See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2674 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
3 See SOMMER, supra note 100, at 158.
360 The Administration of the United States Courts, 2009 Report of
Statistics Required by BAPCPA, 5, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2009/2009BAPCPA.pdf (last visited
Nov. 5, 2010).
361 See SOMMER, supra note 100, at 1.
362 See infra Part IV.A & V.B.
363 See infra Part IV.A.
364 See infra Part IV.B.
365 See infra Part IV.A & IV.B.
366 Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2010).
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to the dollar amount that a debtor claims for exempt property
and that debtors should use the language "Full Market Value
(FMV)" of "100% of FMV" to exempt an asset in its entirety.67
Likewise, if a trustee sees any "full market value" language, the
word "unknown," or anything else that is not a dollar amount
within the statutory limits, he will know that he is required to
object within 30 days -or lose the asset from the bankruptcy
estate.6
For individuals contemplating Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the
lesson of Schwab is two-fold. First, even if debtors accurately
report an asset's value and claim a valid exemption equal to that
value, he cannot later capture any increase in value beyond the
limits imposed by the rules.369 Second, if it is important to exempt
the full market value of an asset or the asset itself rather than a
particular monetized interest in the asset, Schwab suggests one
must claim an exemption for "full fair market value (FMV)" or
"100% of FMV.""
Because the Court reaffirmed its holding in Taylor,
debtors may also list the value of exempt property as "unknown"
to trigger a trustee's duty to object within the designated 30-day
timeframe.37 ' In other words, a debtor can validly list property as
"unknown" unless the current market valuation has a publically
knowable determinable value; therefore, a debtor should not
employ this strategy for estimating the market value of items -
such as deposit accounts, publicly traded stocks and bonds, and
motor vehicles.3 72 However, if the value is not readily knowable,
a debtor can safely list the value as "unknown."7 3 So as not to
367 Ogier, supra note 338, at 68.
368 See, e.g., In re Barroso-Herrans, 524 F.3d 341, 345 (1st Cir. P.R. 2008)
(explaining that Schedule C entries listing the value of a claimed exemption as
"unknown," "to be determined," or "100%" are "red flags to trustees and
creditors," and therefore put them on notice that if they do not object, the
whole value of the asset - whatever it might later turn out to be - will be
exempt (quoting 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 8.06(1)(c)(ii) (15th ed. rev.
2007)).
36 See, e.g., In re Gebhart, 621 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that post-petition appreciation in a debtor's home could be preserved for the
bankruptcy estate).
370 Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2010).
1" Professor Kenneth N. Klee, The Supreme Court's Holding in Schwab v.
Reilly, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4974 1, 3 (2010).
372 Id.
an Brief for Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, supra note 5, at 36. Amicus
National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys pointed out why this
strategy should not be encouraged. Id. First, it ignores the fact that Schedule C
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unduly provoke the trustee into objecting to exemptions, debtors
should be advised to employ this strategy selectively. 37 4
However, this selective strategy could lead to unnecessary
litigation and delay." Trustees may see a valuation of
"unknown" and start to adjourn section 341 creditor meetings as
a matter of course to preserve their right to object after 30-days. 6
Moreover, motions to extend the time for objection to exemptions
may become common practice as valuation issues become more
prevalent." After Schwab, debtors face greater uncertainty
regarding whether their assets are "fully exempt" or whether they
will still be the subject of a trustee's auction.7 Unrepresented
debtors and other debtors not privy to the new "100% of FMV"
listing standard may continue to list the full dollar value of an
asset without realizing that their property remains in jeopardy
throughout the course of their bankruptcy.379
B. The Evolution of the Schwab Decision
An opinion from the Ninth Circuit illustrates the practical
implications of Schwab v. Reilly.s0 In In re Gebhart, the Court
held that a trustee was entitled to reap the benefits of post-
petition appreciation in the debtor's homestead.8 In two
affirmatively requires that debtors state the value of property claim as exempt.
Id. Thus, if a debtor knows or has a reasonable basis for estimating an item's
value, the form obligates him or her to state it. Id. Second, if debtors begin to
use "unknown" as a matter of course to claim as assets as exempt, it will lead to
unnecessary litigation and delay. Id.
374 See Ogier, supra note 338, at 38-39 (stating that trustees often object to
Schedule listings of "unknown" or "$1" as a matter of course).
'" See SOMMER, supra note 100, at 177.
376 See id.
1" Id. (discussing delay tactics employed by trustees).
378 Rebecca L. Saitta & P. Vicky K. Chatha, Supreme Court Holds Oral
Argument in Schwab v. Reilly: Analyzing a Trustee's Duty to Object to a
Facially Valid Exemption, AM. BANKR. INST. (Nov. 3, 2009),
www.abiworld.org/pdfs/SchwabvReillyl 1-03-09.pdf.
"I See, e.g., In re Gebhart, 621 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
debtor responsible for post-petition appreciation in value of his home after he
remained in his home five years after filing for bankruptcy, paying his
mortgage, and believing that his debts were discharged).
31 Id. at 1206.
3 Id. Gebhart involved two consolidated appeals. Id. at 1208. In the first
case, the Debtors filed Chapter 7 in August 2003 and claimed the Arizona
homestead exemption. Id. On the petition date, the Debtor's equity was less
than the $100,000 exemption. Id. The Trustee did not object. Id. In November
2006, the Trustee sought to employ a broker to sell the home, contending that
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consolidated appeals, the trustee sought to sell the home two
years after the bankruptcy was filed-after the homes had
appreciated in value. 382  The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
"[q]uite simply, property that has been exempted belongs to the
debtor."" However, following the Schwab decision, the Court
held that the homestead exemptions at issue did not permit
exemption of entire properties, but only specific dollar amounts.384
The Court reasoned that any additional value in the property
remained the property of the bankruptcy estate, regardless of
whether the extra value existed at the time of filing or whether
the value increased after filing.385 Thus, the Court ruled that the
estate was entitled to any post-petition appreciation in the value
of the property.8
This case illustrates the ramifications of the Schwab
decision.387 Debtors' attorneys can no longer assume that, absent
an objection to an exemption, debtors will be entitled to keep
their property." Debtors will face greater uncertainty regarding
whether their assets are fully exempt or whether they still may be
subject to a trustee's sale motion.389 Finally, the Schwab holding
will likely result in increased litigation and delay because trustees
have a new incentive to intentionally prolong Chapter 7 cases.9 o
its value had appreciated beyond the exemption amount. Id. In the second
case, the Debtor filed bankruptcy in June 2004 and claimed the Washington
homestead exemption. Id. at 1209.
382 Id.
3 Id. at 1210 (quoting Bell v. Bell, 225 F.3d 203, 216 (2d Cir. 2000)).
3s4 Id.
385 Id.
"6 Id. The court acknowledged that Schwab did not address instances in
which the full value of property at the time of filing is in fact equal to or less
than the monetary limit provided for by the relevant bankruptcy exemption.
Id. Although the Court expressed skepticism about the issue, the Ninth Circuit
stated that the Court left open whether such a claim would entitle a debtor to
the property itself as opposed to a payment equal to the property's full value.
Id.
387 Id. at 1211.
388 Id. at 1211-12.
389 Id. The Ninth Circuit recognized that these concerns were legitimate.
Id. After all, the debtor remained in his home for five years after filing for
bankruptcy, paying his mortgage and believing that his bankruptcy was
finished when he received his discharge. Id. See Saitta & Chatha supra note
378, at 2 (discussing concerns about greater debtor uncertainty after Schwab).
390 Id. at 1212 ("A Chapter 7 debtor will not be certain about the status of a
homestead property until the case is closed (something that may not happen
for several years after bankruptcy filing) or the trustee abandons the
property.").
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V. Conclusion
The Schwab decision resolves an important question
concerning the duty of a trustee to object when a debtor values an
asset and a claimed exemption at an identical amount. The
Supreme Court held that trustees have no duty to object if the
claimed exemption is within statutory limits, and further
suggested that debtors may safely signal their intention to claim
an exemption.in the entirety of an asset by writing "100% of Full
Market Value (FMV)" in their lists of claimed exemptions:
While the Court's standard undoubtedly resolves the
circuit split concerning a trustee's objection duty when valuation
issues arise, it has many negative ramifications. First, the Court's
ruling misconstrued the Bankruptcy Code and the Rules.
Considered in the context of instructions provided on official
bankruptcy form Schedule C, the Court's holding cannot be
reconciled with a plain reading of section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b).
The Schwab decision, by permitting trustees to challenge a
debtor's valuation of his exempt property at any point during the
bankruptcy proceedings, also leaves debtors uncertain about their
assets and denies them the benefit of closure. Finally, the Court's
decision is inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code: to give debtors a new beginning. After
Schwab, this new beginning will have to wait.
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